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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
This thesis is divided in two parts. The first part contains Chapters 2 and 3 which
deal with matching theory, and the second part consists of Chapter 4 which deals
with social choice theory.
Matching is a mapping from elements of one set to the elements of another set where
the elements of each pair mutually benefit from each other. Matching Theory, as the
name suggests deals with the concepts and frameworks of matching. To understand
more about matching, consider an example where individuals need to be assigned
to institutions. This is an example of many-to-one matching, because an individual
can only be matched to one institution, whereas an institution may be related to more
individuals than one. This includes a variety of scenarios, for example admitting
students to colleges or schools, employing workers to firms, assigning doctors to hos-
pitals etc. For the sake of convenience, we consider the problem of assigning doctors
to hospitals. Naturally, we would like this matching to satisfy some ‘nice’ proper-
ties. One such property is that a doctor should prefer her assigned hospital to being
unemployed and a hospital should prefer a doctor assigned to it rather than having
1
2a vacancy for that position. It is easy to see that if a matching does not satisfy this
property, then a doctor will prefer to leave the hospital she is assigned to and rather
be unemployed than being at this hospital. Similarly, a hospital will want to remove
such an unwanted doctor that is assigned to it and would rather like to have a position
vacant than have such a doctor. To understand the second property, consider a situa-
tion where a doctor d1 is matched to hospital h1. But d1 prefers another hospital h2
over h1 and h2 prefers d1 over some doctor matched to it. Thus, {d1,h2} would jointly
‘block’ this matching. Therefore, the second property we would like a matching to
satisfy is that it should be immune to any such blocks. A matching which satisfies
these two properties is called stable. Since a hospital can be matched with more than
one doctor, it needs to have a preference over sets of doctors. Thus, if a hospital has
a preference over individual doctors, it needs to extend this preference over sets of
doctors. In the literature responsiveness is a very well studied extension of hospitals’
preferences on individuals in order to obtain a preference over the sets of doctors.
Responsiveness means that if a hospital compares two sets of doctors which differ
in exactly one doctor, then the hospital would prefer the set with the more preferred
doctor. For example, a hospital will prefer the set of doctors {d1,d2} to {d1,d3}, if
and only if the hospital prefers d2 to d3.
The classical result of Gale and Shapley (1962) implies that it is possible to solve the
problem of stable matching when individuals need to be matched with institutions
when institutions have responsive preferences. Their famous ‘deferred acceptance
algorithm’ shows exactly how to form such a stable matching for this problem. A
problem arises when there is a presence of couples among doctors. This problem
stems from the fact that the members of a couple might no longer behave like separate
individual doctors, but rather have a joint preference over pairs of hospitals. Like
hospitals’ preferences, responsiveness of couples’ preferences is also a widely studied
concept. A couple’s preference satisfies responsiveness if unilateral improvement in
the position of one member of the couple is better for the couple itself. Thus, if one
member of the couple is fixed at hospital h1, then the couple will prefer a matching
where the other member is matched to h2 over h3, if and only if that member prefers h2
to h3. However, responsiveness does not determine a complete set of preferences for
hospitals or couples. This is because all sets of doctors or all pairs of hospitals cannot
be compared using responsiveness. For example, consider four doctors d1,d2,d3,d4,
and suppose a hospital h prefers di to di+1 for all i ∈ {1,2,3}. Responsiveness does
not give an ordering between {d1,d4} and {d2,d3} for the hospital. This is because
d1 is the most preferred doctor among all the doctors, but d4 is the least preferred one.
It is easy to see that the same phenomenon also follows while considering responsive
couples’ preferences.
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Given a preference of hospitals on individual doctors, we can have many preferences
on sets of doctors satisfying responsiveness. One such preference is when a hospital
replicates this preference on individual doctors in order to obtain a preference on
sets of doctors. What this means is that if some hospital h1 has a vacancy of ten
doctors, it is the same as having ten identical hospitals with one vacancy each, such
that each hospital has the same preference on individual doctors as h1. What this
in turn implies is that, if a couple tries to block with a hospital, then the hospital
would only consider one member at a time for one position, instead of considering
both members together for two positions. Consider the above example where we
have four doctors and a hospital h. Moreover, let {d1,d4} be a couple in the above
example and let h be matched to {d2,d3}. As noted above, responsiveness does not
specify an ordering between {d1,d4} and {d2,d3}. Thus, if the couple tries to apply
to the hospital, then instead of comparing the set of doctors {d1,d4} to {d2,d3}, the
hospital makes comparisons individually. Thus, since d1 is better but d4 is worse, the
hospital rejects this proposal. Klaus and Klijn (2005), showed that if the preferences
of hospitals are responsive but replicated then we have a stable matching for any
responsive preferences of the couples. Two questions naturally arise from this. One
is, what happens in this set-up if couples’ preferences violate responsiveness. And
the second one is, to check whether the same result holds even when we assume
that hospitals can have any responsive preferences instead of just having replicated
responsive preferences. We try to answer the first question in Chapter 2 where we
assume that couples violate responsiveness only if they can be together at the same
hospital and we try to answer the second question in Chapter 3.
As the name suggests, Social Choice Theory deals with the techniques for finding
a collective choice for society from the given set of alternatives depending on the
preferences of the individuals. The set of alternatives may concern a great variety of
things, for example candidates to vote in an election, a location for a public good, etc.
However, a rational individual would want the best possible choice outcome accord-
ing to her preference. Since the individual preferences are private information, this
might create an incentive for someone to strategically misreport her true preference.
For example, consider three individuals 1,2,3 and three alternatives a,b,c. If two or
more individuals have the same top ranked alternative, then let the rule choose that
alternative and in case all the individuals have different tops, let the rule choose al-
ternative a. Now suppose the top ranked alternatives for 1,2,3 are a,b,c respectively.
But suppose 2 prefers c to a. Thus if all of them report their true preferences, a will
be chosen but if 2 misreports her true preference where c is her top ranked alternative,
then c is chosen which she prefers to a. In order to avoid this manipulation, we expect
our social choice rule to satisfy a property called strategy-proofness. If a choice rule
4satisfies strategy-proofness, then an individual cannot be better of by manipulating
her true preference. Thus this property ensures that individuals honestly report their
true preferences. Another property that a choice rule is usually assumed to satisfy
is that of unanimity, where if an alternative is the top ranked alternative for all the
individuals, then it is chosen. Although these are the most common properties which
a choice function is assumed to follow, we can have other such properties depending
on different contexts.
Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) famously showed that if we have at least
three alternatives and if we allow for the individuals to have any possible preference
then the only rule to satisfy the above mentioned nice properties is a dictatorial one.
This leads to a natural question, whether we can have non-dictatorial choice rules
satisfying the nice properties by enforcing some restrictions on our problem. A nat-
ural way to do so is by restricting the domain of preferences. One such very well
known restriction is that of single-peaked preferences, where each agent has a best
ranked alternative (peak) and the outcomes further from this alternative are preferred
less compared to alternatives that are nearer to the peak. To see that this domain does
not contain all possible preferences, let a,b,c be three alternatives placed sequentially
on a horizontal axis. It is clear that acb and cab are not examples of single-peaked
preferences. It is because if a is the peak, then b is closer to a than c, thus c can never
be preferred to b. There have been many other restrictions of domains that have been
studied in literature.
We assume such a domain restriction in Chapter 4. We assume that every individual
has a partial ordering, and that the domain of preferences of this individual includes
all the preferences containing this partial ordering. It appears that this domain of
preferences is convex with respect to Kemeny distance. As shown in Kemeny et.
al. [1962], the Kemeny distance between two sets is the symmetric set difference
between them. Thus, given any two preferences the Kemeny distance counts the
pairs that are differently ordered in these two preferences. Therefore, given any
two preferences P1 and P2, the Kemeny distance between these two preferences
is the minimum number of switches of adjacent alternatives required to reach
one preference from another, i.e., it gives us the shortest path to reach from one
preference to another. For example, consider three alternatives a,b,c and consider
two preference profiles abc and cab. From abc, we first need to switch b and c
to get the preference acb, followed by a switch between c and a to get preference
cab. Therefore, the Kemeny distance between these two preferences is two. The
preference acb is called the intermediate preference between the preference P1 and
P2. A set of preferences V is called convex if for any two preferences P1 and P2 in V
and any preference P3, if P3 is an intermediate preference of P1 and P2, then P3 lies in
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V .
Now, we will give a short description of the work we have done in the subsequent
chapters.
1.1 Stability in Matching with Couples having Non
Responsive Preferences
In chapter 2 we consider many-to-one matching between hospitals and doctors. How-
ever, the matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as com-
plements. We allow for couples’ preferences to violate responsiveness only if they
can be together at the same hospital. The preferences of the hospitals are assumed
to be responsive. We assume that these preferences over sets of doctors are repli-
cations of preferences over individual doctors. To begin with, we assume that the
hospitals have a common preference over doctors, however, their preference over sets
of doctors may vary. This applies to situations when there is a common admission
test leading to a common ranking. We characterise all preferences of couples where a
stable matchings exists. We find that this only happens when the lower ranked mem-
ber of the couple is ready to ‘compromise’ for the higher ranked member. That is, the
couples’ preferences satisfy responsiveness with respect to the higher ranked mem-
ber of the couple. Then we study the condition on the preferences of hospitals which
allow for a stable matching in case couples’ preferences are unrestricted. Finally, we
relax the assumption of common preference on individual doctors by the hospitals
and establish a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable matching.
1.2 Stability in Matching with Couples having Re-
sponsive Preferences
In chapter 3 as in 2, we study many-to-one matching where there are couples among
doctors. However, the couples’ as well as hospitals’ preferences satisfy responsive-
ness. Contrary to Chapter 2, we assume that different hospitals can have different
preferences over the individuals. What differs in Chapter 3 is that hospitals can have
any responsive preference over the sets of doctors. Thus when a couple applies to
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the same hospital together, the hospital considers them for two positions simultane-
ously, as opposed to Chapter 2, where the members of the couple are considered one
position at a time. We find that even though couples’ preferences satisfy responsive-
ness, stability is not guaranteed. The result obtained here is a remarkable because
responsiveness appears to be a natural extension of individual preferences where we
expect to find stability. We then try to find restrictions on the preferences of couples,
which guarantee the existence of a stable matching for any responsive preferences of
hospitals. Finally, we look at restrictions on the preferences of the hospitals, which
are necessary and sufficient for the existence of stable matching for any responsive
preferences of couples.
1.3 Collective Choice Rules on Convex Restricted Do-
mains
In chapter 4, we study the sets of preferences that are convex with respect to the
Kemeny distance of preferences. It appears that the convex sets consist of all prefer-
ences containing a certain partial ordering and the other way around all preferences
containing a given partial ordering form a convex set. We then consider restricted
domains where each individual has a partial ordering and the domain of preferences
of this individual contain all preferences containing this partial ordering. What is in-
teresting here is that different individuals can have different domains of preferences
depending on the partial ordering which need not be the same for everybody. We call
this partial ordering - a priori information as this partial ordering is already known in
advance for every individual. But even though this a priori information is known for
every individual, the preference of an individual over the whole set of alternatives is
still private information. Necessary and sufficient conditions are then formulated un-
der which a restricted domain admits unanimous, strategy-proof and non-dictatorial
choice rules. Naturally, this work can be applied to a variety of problems, because
we often come across different individuals having different a priori information. And
even though the complete preference of an individual might not be known, a partial
ordering of that individual might still be public information. This can happen due to
various restrictions which can thus lead to entirely different domains of preferences
for them. For example, consider a situation where some friends need to decide on a
common dish to eat for everybody. One of the friends is vegetarian and will prefer
any dish over a dish with meat. Another friend likes meat and will prefer to have
meat over any other dish. Even though this a priori information is common knowl-
edge, still the entire preferences of these two friends is private information. However,
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the difference in a priori information will lead to a completely different domain of
preferences for these two friends, as the preference of these friends over vegetarian
dishes and dishes with meat is exactly opposite.

Part I
Matching Theory
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CHAPTER 2
Stability in Matching with Couples having Non-Responsive
Preferences
2.1 Introduction
In many different contexts, there is a centralized matching procedure by which in-
dividuals on one side of the market are matched to institutions on the other side of
the market. These include the market for lawyers in Canada, children in schools in
the USA, doctors and senior-level health-care professionals in several countries, etc.
A matching is pairwise stable if there does not exist any institution-individual pair
that can block it by getting matched together, such that both of them are better off
compared to their original matching.
Roth (1984)[25] showed that it is possible to design mechanisms which incentivise
only one side of the market to truthfully reveal their preferences. However, the results
on stability have been more promising. The received doctrine is that stable matchings
11
12 2.1. INTRODUCTION
do exist under appropriate domain restrictions. In particular, institutions have to view
individuals as substitutes and individuals must care only about institutions to which
they are matched.
It was first pointed out by Roth (1984)[26] that the presence of couples in the labour
market may lead to an impossibility result where no stable matching exists. This can
happen because couples may view pairs of jobs as complements. In other words, the
assumption that choices of individuals are independent of each other might not apply.
Klaus and Klijn (2005) showed that a stable matching exists when couples’ prefer-
ences satisfy responsiveness, meaning that a couple is better off when any member
of the couple is matched to a more preferred institution keeping the other member
fixed. However, Kojima, Pathak and Roth (2010) pointed out that responsiveness is
not satisfied in their data set because couples show strong preference to be matched
to institutions situated in the same geographical area.
As we have discussed above, matching models disregarding responsive couples pref-
erences are very common. However, taking such preferences into account may come
at the cost of losing stability. We feel that this general non-existence cannot be the
final conclusion. This is primarily because, even though there are profiles where sta-
ble matchings do not exist, it might be very well true that such profiles are rare. For
instance when the disregard for responsiveness occurs in the irrelevant part of the
preferences, i.e. the parts that will never be reached by a matching procedure. More-
over, stability is a property of a matching at a given preference profile, and in many
practical scenarios, there are natural restrictions on profiles. Therefore, it is important
to know whether at a given profile, a stable matching exists. Here we present a first
step in that. We show that there is a problem and moreover formulate a sufficient
condition for couples preferences when there is no further knowledge on the other
agents in the matching procedure.
As in Chapter 1, we consider a matching problem between a set of hospitals and a
set of doctors including some couples. We focus on the issue of existence of sta-
ble matchings with couples. We first look at the scenario when all hospitals have
a common preference over individual doctors. This can be easily justified if hospi-
tals rank doctors according to their grades of some common examination. Hospitals’
preferences over sets of doctors are derived from the common preference by using
responsiveness. Responsiveness means that for two allocations of a hospital, which
differ by exactly one doctor, the hospital prefers the allocation with the better doc-
tor. However, these preferences might vary from one hospital to the other. Each
individual doctor has a strict preference over hospitals. The preference of a couple
is derived from the preferences of members of the couple. In view of the preceding
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discussion, we let couples’ preferences violate responsiveness in an appropriate way
to capture their willingness to be matched together. Thus, in the spirit of Dutta and
Massó (1997), we assume that a couple prefers to be matched at the same hospital
rather than being matched to different hospitals. We show that if hospitals have a
common preference over doctors, then stable matching exists if and only if each cou-
ple’s preference does not violate responsiveness with respect to the more preferred
member of the couple (according to the common preference of hospitals).
Next, we consider the scenario where a couple is allowed to have arbitrary non-
responsive preferences over pairs of hospitals. In other words, a couple need not
always prefer to stay together, they may like to stay apart as well. We show that
when couples’ preferences are arbitrary, then stable matching exists if and only if for
each couple one of the following happens: (i) either the members of the couple are
ranked consecutively or (ii) there is at most one doctor ranked in-between the mem-
bers and one member of the couple is ranked at the bottom of the common preference
of hospitals.
Finally, we relax the assumption of a common preference of hospitals. First, we
show by means of an example that if the relative ordering of members of a couple is
different in different hospitals and that couples’ preferences violate responsiveness in
order to be together, then a stable matching may not exist. In view of this, we assume
the relative ordering of members of each couple to be the same in every hospital’s
preference and provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable matching.
This chapter is organised as follows. We formally introduce the model, providing all
the necessary definitions, notations and algorithms which are used throughout this
chapter in Section 2.2. We provide an example in Section 2.3 to show that stabil-
ity is not guaranteed when couples violate responsivness to be together even when
hospitals have common preference on the individuals. In Section 2.4, we provide a
necessary and sufficient condition on couples’ preferences for the existence of a sta-
ble matching when institutions have a common preference over individual doctors.
Section 2.5 deals with further restrictions on the common preference of hospitals and
establishes conditions on the same that guarantee existence of a stable matching when
couples’ preferences are unrestricted. Finally, in Section 2.6, we relax the assumption
of a common preference of hospitals and provide sufficient condition for existence of
stable matching.
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2.2 The framework
We consider many-to-one matching1 between doctors and hospitals. We denote by H
the set of hospitals. We use the notation H¯ to denote H ∪{ /0}. The interpretation of /0
is that if some doctor is matched to /0, then that doctor is practically unmatched (i.e.,
is not assigned to any hospital). Each hospital h ∈ H has a finite capacity, denoted by
κh ≥ 2.
We denote by D the set of doctors. We assume that D = F ∪M∪S, where F,M,S are
pairwise disjoint sets of doctors. We denote the doctors in F by { f1, . . . , fk} and those
in M by {m1, . . . ,mk}, for some k ∈ N where N denotes the set of natural numbers.
This, in particular, means that F and M have the same number of doctors. The doctors
in F and M together form fixed couples, whereas the doctors in S are not part of any
couple. We call the doctors in S single doctors and those in M or F non-single doctors.
We denote the set of couples by C = {{ f1,m1}, . . . ,{ fk,mk}} and a generic couple by
c = { f ,m}.
Throughout this chapter, we assume |H| ≥ 2, |D| ≥ 4 and |C| ≥ 1. That is, there are
at least two hospitals and four doctors including at least one couple. We also assume
that the total number of vacancies in all hospitals in H is equal to the total number of
doctors available, i.e., ∑h∈H κh = |D|.
An allocation of a couple c = { f ,m} is an element (h,h′) of H¯2 where hospitals h and
h′ are matched with doctors f and m, respectively. As we have already mentioned,
here one or both of h and h′ might be empty, which would mean that the correspond-
ing doctor(s) is(are) not matched with any hospital.
For notational convenience, we do not use braces for singleton sets.
2.2.1 Matching
A matching is an allocation of the doctors over the hospitals such that the total allo-
cation of doctors in a hospital does not exceed its capacity and a doctor is allocated to
at most one hospital (i.e., is allocated to exactly one hospital or no hospital). Below,
we provide a formal definition of this.
1See Sönmez(1996), and Martínez et al.(2000) for some work on stability in many-to-one matching.
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Definition 2.1. A matching on H ∪D is a mapping µ on H ∪D such that:
(i) for all h ∈ H, µ(h)⊆ D with |µ(h)| ≤ κh,
(ii) for all d ∈ D, µ(d) ∈ H¯,
(iii) for all d ∈ D and all h ∈ H, µ(d) = h if and only if d ∈ µ(h).
2.2.2 Preferences
In this section, we introduce the notion of preferences of doctors and hospitals. We
also propose certain restrictions on those.
For a set X , we denote by L(X) the set of linear orders, i.e., complete, reflexive,
transitive, and antisymmetric binary relations over X . An element R ∈ L(X) is called
a preference over X and P is the strict part of R. Since a preference is antisymmetric,
xRy implies either x = y or xPy. For P ∈L(X) and k ≤ |X |, we define rk(P) as the k-th
ranked alternative in P, that is, rk(P) = x if and only if |{y ∈ X : yRx}|= k. Moreover,
for P ∈ L(X) and x ∈ X , we define by r(x,P) the rank of x in P, that is, r(x,P) = k if
and only if rk(P) = x.
Preferences of Hospitals
For any hospital h ∈ H, a preference of h over individual doctors, denoted by P˜h, is
defined as an element of L(D∪{ /0}).
We assume dP˜h /0 for all d ∈ D and all h ∈ H. That is, a hospital always prefers to have
a doctor than having a vacant position.
For a hospital h, the feasible sets of doctors (given its capacity) is defined as {D′ ⊆D :
|D′| ≤ κh}. A preference over feasible sets of doctors of a hospital h is an element of
L({D′ ⊆ D : |D′| ≤ κh}). In what follows we discuss how a preference of a hospital
over individual doctors is extended to that over feasible sets of doctors. We introduce
the notion of responsiveness in this context.
Responsiveness captures the idea of separability that is used in the context of ex-
tending preferences over individual dimensions to that over over multi-dimensions.
Roughly speaking, responsiveness says that hospitals always prefer it when they get
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a better doctor (or set of doctors). For example, consider a preference P˜h of a hos-
pital over the individual doctors {d1,d2,d3,d4}, where d1P˜hd2P˜hd3P˜hP˜hd4. Then, re-
sponsiveness says that the pair (d1,d2) will be preferred to the pair (d1,d3), the set
(d1,d2,d4) will be preferred to the set (d1,d3,d4), etc. in the extension of P˜h over
feasible sets of doctors. It is important to note that responsiveness does not say how
the hospital h will compare certain sets of doctors, for instance, the pairs (d1,d4) and
(d2,d3). So, one can have a responsive extension of P˜h where the first pair is preferred
to the second, and another where the second pair is preferred to the first. Below, we
provide a formal definition of responsive extension.
Definition 2.2. Let h be a hospital with capacity κh and let P˜h be a preference of
h over individual doctors. Then, a preference Ph of h over feasible sets of doctors
satisfies responsiveness with respect to P˜h if
(i) the restriction of Ph over individual doctors coincides with P˜h, that is, for all
d,d′ ∈ D∪{ /0}, dPhd′ if and only if dP˜hd′, and
(ii) for all D′ ( D and all D1,D2 ⊆ D\D′ such that |D′∪D1| ≤ κh and |D′∪D2| ≤
κh, we have (D′∪D1)Ph(D′∪D2) if and only if D1PhD2.
Next, we define the notion of common preference of hospitals over individual doctors.
As the name suggests, this simply says that all the hospitals have the same preference
over the individual doctors. Such a preference can be viewed as the common ranking
of the individual doctors based on the grades of some common examination, etc. Note
that hospitals may, in principle, differ on the extension of this common preference
over sets of feasible doctors.
Definition 2.3. Let {Ph}h∈H be a collection of preferences of hospitals over feasible
sets of doctors and let P0 ∈ L(D∪{ /0}). Then, {Ph}h∈H is said to satisfy Common
Preference over Individual doctors (CPI) with respect to P0 if for all h ∈ H, Ph is
responsive with respect to P0.
Unless mentioned otherwise, we assume CPI for every collection of preferences of
hospitals. Whenever we consider a collection of preferences satisfying CPI with re-
spect to P0, we assume for ease of presentation that the indexation of the doctors in
couples is such that f P0m for every couple c = { f ,m} ∈C, and that of the couples in
C = {{ f1,m1}, . . . ,{ fk,mk}} is such that m1P0m2P0 . . .P0mk. This is without of loss
of generality as we consider only one CPI at every given context.
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Preferences of Doctors
Every doctor has a preference over the hospitals including the ‘empty’ hospital /0.
Thus, a preference Pd of a doctor d ∈ D is an element of L(H¯). We assume hPd /0
for all h ∈ H and all d ∈ D. In other words, all doctors prefer being matched to
some hospital than being unemployed. Now, we proceed to define the preferences of
couples based on the preferences of the members in it.
Preferences of Couples
Each couple has a preference over the pairs of hospitals. Thus, a preference Pc of
a couple c is an element of L(H¯2). Recall that an allocation (h1,h2) for a couple
c = { f ,m} means that f is matched with h1 and m is matched with h2.
As we have discussed in Section 2.1, in this chapter we intend to deviate from re-
sponsiveness in a ‘minimal’ way and study its consequences on stability. We assume
that a preference of a couple is responsive except in the situations where both the
members of the couple get to stay together at some hospital. For instance, if f prefers
h1 to h2 and m prefers h2 to h1, then, in contrast to responsiveness where the pair
(h1,h2) should have been preferred to both the pairs (h1,h1) and (h2,h2), we allow
for the couple { f ,m} to prefer (h1,h1) or (h2,h2) or both to the pair (h1,h2). Clearly,
we allow this because at the allocation (h1,h1) or (h2,h2), the members of the couple
can benefit from staying together. We call this ‘preference for togetherness’. Note
that we still assume that a couple prefers an allocation where both its members are
matched to another where at least one member is unmatched.
To define the notion of responsiveness violated for togetherness, we use the notion of
responsiveness for couples’ preferences. This notion of responsiveness is exactly the
same as that for a preference of a hospital. However, for the sake of completeness,
we present the formal definition of this here.
Definition 2.4. Let c = { f ,m} be any couple and suppose Pf and Pm are the pref-
erences of f and m, respectively. Then, a preference Pc ∈ L(H¯2) of the couple c is
called responsive with respect to Pf and Pm if, for all h,h1,h2 ∈ H¯, we have
(i) (h,h1)Pc(h,h2) if and only if h1Pmh2,
(ii) (h1,h)Pc(h2,h) if and only if h1Pf h2, and
(iii) (h1,h2)Rc(h,{ /0}) and (h1,h2)Rc({ /0},h).
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Now, we are ready to define the notion of responsiveness violated for togetherness
for preferences of couples.
Definition 2.5. Let c = { f ,m} be any couple and let Pf and Pm be the preferences
of f and m, respectively. Then, a preference P¯c ∈ L(H¯2) of c satisfies responsiveness
violated for togetherness (RVT) if there exists a responsive (with respect to Pf and
Pm) preference Pc of c such that
(i) for all h ∈ H and all (h1,h2) ∈ H¯2, if (h,h)Pc(h1,h2) then we have
(h,h)P¯c(h1,h2), and
(ii) for all (h,h′),(h1,h2) ∈ H¯2 such that h 6= h′ and h1 6= h2, we have
(h,h′)Pc(h1,h2) if and only if (h,h′)P¯c(h1,h2).
Note that RVT implies that couples’ preferences can violate responsiveness only in
order to be together at some hospital. In other words, responsiveness can only vio-
lated in favor of the pairs of the form (h,h). Also, by taking h1 = h2 in Condition
(i) of Definition 2.5, it follows that for all h,h′ ∈ H, (h,h)Pc(h′,h′) if and only if
(h,h)P¯c(h′,h′).
Preference profiles and matching problems
A preference profile is a collection of preferences for all the doctors in D, all the
couples in C, and all the hospitals in H, where hospitals’ preferences are assumed to
be responsive. Thus, a preference profile, denoted by P˜, is a collection of preferences({P˜d}d∈D,{P˜c}c∈C,{P˜h}h∈H) where for all d ∈D, c∈C and h∈H, P˜d is a preferenceof doctor d, P˜c is a preference of couple c and P˜h is a responsive preference overfeasible sets of doctors of hospital h, respectively.
By a matching problem, we mean a set of hospitals with corresponding capacities, a
set of doctors with its partition into the sets F , M, and S, and a preference profile.
2.2.3 Stability
Our model is formally equivalent to a many-to-many matching market as a couple
looks for two positions and hospitals have at least two positions. Thus, one can
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have different notions of stability based on different types of permissible blocking
coalitions.2
Blocking pairs can be a hospital and a single doctor or a pair of hospitals and a couple.
We say a hospital h is ‘interested’ in a set of doctors D′ at a matching µ if there is
D′′ ⊆ µ(h) such that {(µ(h)\D′′)∪D′}Phµ(h). In other words, a hospital is interested
in a set of doctors at a matching if it prefers to appoint those doctors by possibly
removing some of its existing/matched doctors (to adjust its capacity). Similarly, we
say a doctor d (couple c) is interested in a hospital h (pair of hospitals (h,h′)) at a
matching µ if hPd µ(h) ((h,h′)Pcµ(c)). Note that if a hospital is interested in a set of
doctors or a doctor (couple) is interested in a hospital (pair of hospitals) at a matching
µ , then it must be that they are not (already) matched at µ .
Now, we define the notion of (individual) blocking between a hospital and a single
doctor.
Definition 2.6. For a single doctor s, a hospital h, and a matching µ , we say (h,s)
blocks µ if both h and s are interested in each other at µ .
Thus, a hospital and a single doctor block a matching if they are not matched together
at that matching but prefer to be so.
Next, we define the notion of blocking between a pair of hospitals and a couple. A
pair of hospitals and a couple, who are not already matched, blocks a matching if the
couple prefers to be matched with that pair of hospitals, and the hospitals from that
pair who are getting a new doctor from the couple is interested in getting it. Thus, the
crucial thing here is that one of the members of the blocking couple might already be
matched with one of the hospitals in the blocking pair. In that case, the other hospital
must be interested in getting the other member of the couple. One might think that
this case can be captured by our notion of (individual) blocking between the ‘other
hospital’ and the ‘other doctor’. Firstly, note that we have such notion of blocking
only between hospitals and single doctors. Secondly, even if we define the notion
of blocking between arbitrary (not necessarily single) individual doctor and hospital,
that would not capture this situation as the other doctor might not be interested in the
other hospital according to his/her individual preference but interested according to
his/her couple preference.
2See Roth (1984) [7], Roth (1984) [8], Konishi and Ünver (2006), Echenique and Oviedo (2006),
Hatfield and Kojima (2010), for some alternative notions of stability in many-to-many matchings.
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Definition 2.7. For a couple c = { f ,m}, a pair of hospitals (h f ,hm), and a matching
µ , we say ((h f ,hm),c) blocks µ if c is interested in (h f ,hm) at µ , and
(i) if µ(x) 6= hx for all x ∈ { f ,m}, then h f is interested in f and hm is interested in
m,
(ii) if hx = µ(x) and hy 6= µ(y) for x,y ∈ { f ,m}, then hy is interested in y.
One important thing to note about our notion of blocking is that here hospitals are
myopic in the sense that when they remove a member of a couple, they do not consider
the possibility of losing the other member of it. We consider this model as otherwise
a farsighted notion of blocking would require a hospital to estimate the possibility
of losing the ‘other member’ by checking whether there is really any hospital for
that member to go (to be better off individually or by couple’s preference). Such a
notion will complicate the model considerably, and more importantly, doing so much
of calculations in order to decide who to appoint or remove is practically impossible
for big institutions like hospitals.
Definition 2.8. A matching µ is stable if it can not be blocked.
Remark 2.1. By our assumption that each hospital finds each doctor acceptable
and each doctor finds each hospital acceptable, every stable matching is individually
rational.
2.2.4 Two well-known algorithms
In this section, we present a well-known algorithm called doctor proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm (DPDA). This algorithm was introduced by Gale and Shap-
ley(1962).3 However, for our purpose, we modify this algorithm slightly. We use
this modified algorithm to match hospitals with doctors. In what follows, we give a
short description of DPDA, where each doctor d has a preference Pd over hospitals
and each hospital h has a preference Ph over feasible sets of doctors.
DPDA: This algorithm has multiple stages. In stage 1, each doctor d ∈ D proposes
to his/her most preferred hospital according Pd . Each hospital h ∈ H provisionally
3Since Gale and Shapley’s work, stable matching problem in two sided matching has received a lot
of attention (Knuth(1976), Gusfield and Irving(1989), Roth and Sotomayer(1990), Aldershof and Car-
ducci(1996) being some notable examples of such work.
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accepts the most preferred collection of doctors according to Ph. If a hospital h re-
ceives more than κh proposals, then it keeps its most preferred κh many doctors from
these proposals and rejects all others. Having defined stages 1, . . . ,k, the stage k+1
is defined in the following way: Each unmatched (till stage k) doctor d proposes to
his/her most preferred hospital from the remaining set of hospitals who have not re-
jected him/her in any of the earlier stages. If a hospital, whose provisional list of
accepted doctors is less than its capacity, receives one or more fresh proposal, then it
continues to add to its accepted list (till its capacity). However, if a hospital h, whose
provisional list of doctors is equal to its capacity, receives one or more fresh proposal,
then it accepts some of these fresh proposals by rejecting same number of relatively
worse (according to Ph) doctors that it provisionally accepted earlier. The algorithm
finally terminates when each doctor is either matched with some hospital or has been
rejected by all hospitals.
Remark 2.2. In DPDA, each individual doctor proposes according to his/her indi-
vidual preference. Therefore, couples do not play any role in it.
Now, we present another well-known algorithm called serial dictatorship algorithm
(SDA). We give a short description of SDA where hospitals’ preferences satisfy CPI
with respect to P0. Recall that unless otherwise mentioned, we assume that hospitals’
preferences satisfy CPI property. That is, they have a common ranking, denoted by
P0, over individual doctors.
SDA: In SDA, the highest-ranked doctor according to P0 chooses his/her most-
preferred hospital, and in general, the j-th ranked doctor according to P0 chooses
his/her most preferred hospital among the hospitals with available vacancy after all
the better (with rank less than j) doctors have made their choices.
Our next remark is a standard result in matching theory.
Remark 2.3. Both DPDA and SDA produce the same matching when hospitals’ pref-
erences satisfy CPI.
2.3 Stability is not guaranteed under RVT
In this section, we explore the possibility of having a stable matching when couples’
preferences satisfy RVT property, that is, are allowed to violate responsiveness in
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order for them to be employed together at a hospital. First, we show by the means of
an example that, even when hospitals’ preferences satisfy CPI, that is, have a common
preference over individuals, a stable matching is not guaranteed in such situations.
Example 2.1. Suppose there are two hospitals each having capacity 2, two single
doctors, and two other non-single doctors forming a couple. Formally, suppose H =
{h1,h2}, κh1 = κh2 = 2, and D = {s1,s2, f ,m} where c = { f ,m} is the only couple.
Consider the preference profile given in Table 2.1. Here, both the hospitals have a
common preference over individual doctors which is denoted by P0.
We do not present the preferences of hospitals over feasible sets of doctors because
that does not play any role in this example. The couple’s preference over pairs of
hospitals, where one member is matched and the other one is unmatched, is not shown
in the table, but is assumed to be responsive and ranked below the shown pairs.
P0 Ps1 Ps2 Pf Pm Pc
f h2 h1 h2 h1 (h1,h1)
s1 h1 h2 h1 h2 (h2,h1)
s2 (h2,h2)
m (h1,h2)
Table 2.1: No Stable Matching under RVT
Note that the couple’s preference violates responsiveness in order to be together at h1
since the pair (h1,h1) is preferred to the pair (h2,h1) in its preference.
Now we show that there does not exist a stable matching at the given preference
profile. Suppose on the contrary that µ is a stable matching at this profile. Since
the couple prefers to be matched to any pair of hospitals than having a member un-
matched, it follows that both the members of the couple must be matched with some
hospitals at the matching µ . We consider all such allocations of the couple c, and
show that blocking happens for each of these allocations.
(i) Suppose µ(c) = (h1,h1).
Since h1Ps2h2 and s2P
0m, (h1,s2) blocks µ .
(ii) Suppose µ(c) = (h2,h1).
Because h2Ps1h1 and s1P
0s2P0m, it must be that µ(s1) = h2. Moreover,
by responsiveness, { f ,m}Ph1{s2,m}. This, together with the fact that
(h1,h1)Pc(h2,h1), implies ((h1,h1),c) blocks µ .
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(iii) Suppose µ(c) = (h2,h2).
Since h2Ps1h1 and s1P
0m, (h2,s1) blocks µ .
(iv) Suppose µ(c) = (h1,h2).
Because h2Ps1h1 and s1P
0s2P0m, we have µ(s1) = h2. Moreover, by respon-
siveness { f ,m}Ph2{s1,m}. This, together with the fact that (h2,h2)Pc(h1,h2),
implies ((h2,h2),c) blocks µ .
Since Cases (i)-(iv) are exhaustive, it follows that there does not exist a stable match-
ing at the preference profile given in Table 2.1.
2.4 Existence of stable matching when couples’ pref-
erences satisfy RVT
In view of the fact that existence of stable matchings is not guaranteed when cou-
ples are allowed to violate responsiveness for togetherness, we search for additional
conditions on couples’ preferences so that the said existence is guaranteed.
Let P0C = ({P0d }d∈D\S,{P0c }c∈C) be a given collection of preferences of non-single
doctors (i.e., the doctors in D\S) and couples such that for all c ∈C, P0c satisfies RVT.
Given such a collection of preferences P0C , an extension of P
0
C refers to any preference
profile where (i) the preferences of non-single doctors and couples are as given in P0C ,
and (ii) hospitals’ preferences satisfy CPI with respect to some preference P0 over the
individual doctors.
Recall that whenever hospitals’ preferences over feasible sets of doctors satisfy CPI
with respect to some preference P0 over individual doctors, we assume that fiP0mi
for each couple { fi,mi}.
In what follows, we present a condition, called responsive for F , that we use in de-
scribing situations where stable matchings exist. Responsive for F property implies
that couples’ preferences are always responsive with respect to f . More precisely, if
a couple moves together to a hospital from a pair of hospitals, then it must be that the
f -member of the couple prefers that hospital to the hospital that he/she was originally
matched with. In other words, compromise is always made by m in order for a couple
{ f ,m} to be together at some hospital.
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Definition 2.9. A collection of preferences P0C is said to be responsive for F if for all
c = { f ,m} ∈C and all h,h′ ∈ H, (h,h)P0c (h′,h) implies hP0f h′.
Now, we present our first theorem which provides a necessary and sufficient condition
for the existence of stable matchings at every possible extension of a given collection
of preferences P0C . In particular, it says that a stable matching exists at every possible
extension of P0C if and only if P
0
C satisfies the responsive for F property. In the interest
of readability, we present the if part and the only if part of this theorem separately.
Theorem 2.1. (i) If P0C satisfies responsive for F property, then a stable matching
exists at every extension of P0C .
(ii) If P0C does not satisfy responsive for F property, then there always exists an exten-
sion of P0C at which there is no stable matching.
Proof. [Part (i)] The proof of this part is constructive. Suppose P0C is responsive for
F. We show that every extension
˜
P of P0C has a stable matching.
Take an extension
˜
P of P0C . For all m ∈ M and all h ∈ H, define the conditional
preference of m given h, denoted by P0m|h, as an element of L(H) such that h
′P0m|hh
′′ if
and only if (h,h′)P0c (h,h′′), where c = { f ,m}.
Recall that by our initial assumption on CPI, miP0m j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,k} such that
i < j. In the following, we present an algorithm that produces a stable matching at
˜
P.
ALGORITHM 1: This algorithm involves k+ 1 steps. We present the 1st step and a
general step of the algorithm.
Step 1: Use SDA to match all the doctors ranked above m1 according to P0. Suppose
f1 is matched to some hospital h1. Then, match m1 using SDA where m1 proposes
according to the preference P0m1|h1 .
...
Step j: Having matched all the doctors from the top till m j−1 according to P0 in steps
1 to j−1, use SDA to match all doctors ranked below m j−1 and above m j according
to P0. Suppose f j is matched to some hospital h j. Then, match m j by SDA where m j
proposes according to the preference P0m j |h j .
...
CHAPTER 2. STABILITY IN MATCHING WITH COUPLES HAVING
NON-RESPONSIVE PREFERENCES 25
Continue this process till Step k and then match the remaining single doctors by SDA
in step k+1.
Let µ be the outcome of Algorithm 1. We show that µ is stable at
˜
P.
First, we show that µ cannot be blocked by (h,s) for some h ∈ H and s ∈ S. Assume
for contradiction that some pair (h,s) blocks µ . By the nature of Algorithm 1, all
doctors who propose before s are ranked above s in P0. Since s /∈ µ(h), this means
either µ(s)
˜
Psh or dP0s for all d ∈ µ(h) and |µ(h)| = κh. Clearly, if µ(s)˜Psh then sdoes not block with h. On the other hand, if dP0s for all d ∈ µ(h) and |µ(h)| = κh,
then by responsiveness of hospitals’ preferences, we have µ(h)
˜
Ph((µ(h)\d)∪ s) for
all d ∈ µ(h). Therefore, h does not block with s. This proves that µ can not by
blocked a hospital and a single doctor.
Now, we show that µ cannot be blocked by ((h1,h2),c) for some h1,h2 ∈ H and
c ∈C. Assume for contradiction that some ((h1,h2),c) blocks µ . Let c = { f ,m}. We
complete the proof in two steps.
Step 1: In this step, we show that if ((h1,h2),c) blocks µ , then ((µ( f ),h2),c) also
blocks µ . Clearly, if µ( f ) = h1, then there is nothing to show. So, suppose µ( f ) 6= h1.
First, we claim µ( f )P0f h1. Assume for contradiction that h1P
0
f µ( f ). Since f proposes
according to P0f and all the doctors that propose before f are ranked above f in P
0,
f /∈ µ(h1) implies that dP0 f for all d ∈ µ(h1) and |µ(h1)|= κh1 . By responsiveness
of hospitals’ preferences, this means µ(h1)˜
Ph1((µ(h1) \ d)∪ f ) for all d ∈ µ(h1).
However, this contradicts that ((h1,h2),c) blocks µ . Therefore, µ( f )P0f h1.
Next, we show that (µ( f ),h2)P0c (h1,h2). Assume for contradiction that
(h1,h2)P0c (µ( f ),h2). If h1 6= h2, then RVT implies h1P0f µ( f ), which is a contra-
diction. On the other hand, if h1 = h2, then by the responsive for F property implies
h1P0f µ( f ), which is a contradiction.
Now, we complete Step 1. Since ((h1,h2),c) blocks µ , it must be that
((µ(h2) \ d) ∪ m)Ph2 µ(h2) for some d ∈ µ(h2). Because (µ( f ),h2)P0c (h1,h2),
it follows that ((µ( f ),h2),c) blocks µ .
Step 2: In this step, we show that ((µ( f ),h2),c) cannot block µ .
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Suppose µ( f ) = h. Because (µ( f ),h2)P0c (µ( f ),µ(m)), the definition of P0m|h implies
h2P0m|hµ(m). Since all doctors who propose before m are ranked above m in P
0 and
m /∈ µ(h2), it must be that dP0m for all d ∈ µ(h2) and |µ(h2)|= κh2 . By responsive-
ness of hospitals’ preferences, this means µ(h2)˜
Ph2((µ(h2)\d)∪m) for all d ∈ µ(h2).
However, this contradicts that ((µ( f ),h2),c) blocks µ .
This completes the first part of the theorem.
[Part (ii)] Suppose P0C is not responsive for F. We show that there is an extension
of P0C with no stable matching. Since P
0
C does not satisfy responsive for F prop-
erty, there must exist a couple c = { f ,m} and two hospitals h1,h2 ∈ H such that
(h1,h1)P0c (h2,h1) and h2P
0
f h1. Moreover, since h2P
0
f h1, it follows from the definition
of RVT that (h2,h2)P0c (h1,h2).
Consider a profile
˜
P such that
1. there are doctors d1,d2 ∈D\{ f ,m} with f P0d1P0d2P0m such that r1(˜Pd1) = h1and r1(˜Pd2) = h2,
2. |{d : dP0 f and r1(˜Pd) = h2}|= κh2 −2, |{d : dP
0 f and r1(˜
Pd) = h1}|= κh1 −2,
and |{d : dP0 f and r1(˜Pd) = h}|= κh for all h 6= h1,h2, and
3. the preferences of all couples other than c satisfy responsiveness.
Since ∑h∈H κh = |D| by the construction of ˜P, the four bottom-ranked (lowest ranked)doctors in P0 are f ,d1,d2,m. We show that there is no stable matching at ˜P. Assumefor contradiction that a matching µ is stable matching at
˜
P. Since µ is stable at
˜
P, by
the construction
˜
P, it is straight forward that µ(d) = r1(˜
Pd) for all dP0 f .
Because |{d : dP0 f and r1(˜Pd) = h}| = κh for all h 6= h1,h2, stability of µ impliesthat the doctors f ,d1,d2,m cannot be matched to any hospital other than h1 and h2.
Moreover, since |{d : dP0 f and r1(˜Pd) = h2}|= κh2 −2 and |{d : dP
0 f and r1(˜
Pd) =
h1}|= κh1 −2, exactly two doctors among f ,d1,d2,m must be matched to each of h1
and h2.
Now, we distinguish the following cases depending on the allocation of the couple c
and show that µ is not stable in any of these cases.
• Suppose µ(c) = (h2,h2).
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Then, (h2,d2) blocks µ as r1(˜
Pd2) = h2 and d2P
0m.
• Suppose µ(c) = (h1,h2).
Then, ((h2,h2),c) blocks µ as f P0d1P0d2, and by RVT, (h2,h2)P0c (h1,h2).
• Suppose µ(c) = (h1,h1).
Then, (h1,d1) blocks µ as r1(˜
Pd1) = h1 and d1P
0m.
• Suppose µ(c) = (h2,h1).
Then, ((h1,h1),c) blocks µ as f P0d1P0d2, and by RVT, (h1,h1)P0c (h2,h1).
This completes the proof.
2.5 Existence of stable matching with strong CPI
In Section 2.4, we have considered the case where couples violate responsiveness for
being matched together at some hospital and have provided a necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of stable matchings. In this section, we go beyond RVT
and consider arbitrary violation of responsiveness of couples’ preferences. In other
words, we assume that a couple can have any preference over pairs of hospitals irre-
spective of the individual preferences of its members. Note that in our model a couple
need not be a wife-husband pair, it only represents a pair of doctors who have a joint
preference. For instance, a couple might consist of two jealousy/competitive people
or two exes, etc. Thus, a couple need not be always willing to stay together, instead it
might prefer to stay apart. This justifies our consideration of arbitrary couples’ pref-
erences. Note that we still assume that any couple prefers an allocation where each
member of the couple is matched to some hospital over an allocation where at least
one member of the couple is unmatched. In this setting, we introduce the notion of
strong CPI and show that strong CPI is both necessary and sufficient for the existence
of a stable matching.
In what follows, we provide a verbal description of the strong CPI property. Suppose
that hospitals’ preferences satisfy CPI with respect to P0. Roughly speaking, strong
CPI ensures that the members of each couple are ranked ‘very close’ to each other.
More precisely, it says that (i) if the m-member of a couple is not the worst doctor
of D according to P0 and if there are enough doctors in D to fill (or exceed) the
capacity of at least one hospital, then, in fact, the members of that couple must be
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ranked consecutively in P0, (ii) otherwise, there can be at most one doctor ranked
in-between the members of the couple. Below, we provide the formal definition of
this.
Recall that whenever hospitals’ preferences are assumed to satisfy CPI with respect
to some P0, we assume f P0m for any couple { f ,m}. Also, recall that we write
r(d,P0) = k to mean that d has rank k in P0, that is, rk(P0) = d.
Definition 2.10. Let hospitals’ preferences satisfy CPI with respect to P0. Then, P0
is said to satisfy strong CPI (SCPI) if for any couple c = { f ,m} ∈C,
(i) r(m,P0) 6= |D| implies either |{d ∈ D : f P0dP0m}|= 0 or |{d ∈ D : dP0m}|<
κh for all h ∈ H, and
(ii) r(m,P0) = |D| implies |{d ∈ D : f P0dP0m}| ≤ 1.
A preference Pc of a couple c ∈C is unrestricted if it is an arbitrary element of L(H¯2)
satisfying the only requirement that the couple prefers both its members to be matched
to some hospital rather than having at least one member unmatched.
Suppose that hospitals’ preferences satisfy CPI with respect to some preference P0
over the individual doctors. We introduce the notion of extension of this preference P0
to preference profiles. As the name suggests, an extension of P0 to a preference profile
is basically a preference profile where hospitals satisfy CPI with respect to P0. By an
RVT extension of P0, we refer to any preference profile where couples’ preferences
satisfy RVT, and by an unrestricted extension of P0, we refer any preference profile
where the couples’ preferences are unrestricted. Of course, in both these extensions
hospitals’ preferences satisfy CPI with respect to P0.
Our next theorem provides a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable matching
at every unrestricted extension of hospitals’ preferences satisfying CPI.
Theorem 2.2. Let hospitals’ preferences satisfy CPI with respect to P0. If P0 satisfies
SCPI, then a stable matching exists at every unrestricted extension of P0.
Proof. Suppose P0 satisfies SCPI. We show that there exists a stable matching for
every unrestricted extension
˜
P of P0. Recall that by our initial assumption on CPI,
miP0m j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,k} such that i < j. Since P0 satisfies SCPI, this means
fiP0 f j for all i, j ∈{1, . . . ,k} such that i< j. In the following, we present an algorithm
that produces a stable matching at
˜
P.
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ALGORITHM 2: We present the 1st step and a general step of the algorithm.
Step 1: Use SDA to match all the doctors who are ranked above f1 according to P0.
Let c1 propose to the hospital(s) r1(˜
Pc1), say (h1,h2). If any member of the couple is
rejected, i.e., if f1 is rejected by h1 and/or m1 is rejected by h2, then let c1 propose to
r2(˜
Pc1). Again, if any member of the couple is rejected, then let c1 propose to r3(˜
Pc1),
and so on. Continue this process till both members of the couple are accepted.
...
Step j: Having matched all the doctors from the top till c j−1 in P0 in steps 1 to j−1,
use SDA to match all the doctors that ranked below c j−1 and above c j according to
P0. Let c j propose to r1(˜
Pc j). If at least one member of the couple is rejected, then
let c j propose to r2(˜
Pc j), and so on. Continue this process till both the members of
the couple are accepted.
...
Continue this process till Step k−1. Having matched all the doctors from the top till
ck−1 according to P0 in steps 1 to k− 1, use SDA to match all the doctors that are
ranked below ck−1 and above fk according to P0. We distinguish the following two
cases to match remaining doctors.
Case 1. Suppose there is no single doctor in between fk and mk in P0 or |{d ∈ D :
dP0mk}|< κh for all h ∈ H. Let ck propose to r1(˜Pck). If at least one member of thecouple is rejected, then let ck propose to r2(˜Pck), and so on. Continue this processtill both the members of the couple are accepted. Finally, match all the remaining
doctors using SDA.
Case 2. Suppose there is a single doctor, say s′, in between fk and mk in P0. Note
that by SCPI, there cannot be more than one single doctor in between fk and mk.
Suppose H ′ is the set of hospitals that have at least one remaining vacancy. Let h′ be
the worst hospital in H ′ according to
˜
Ps′ and let h ∈ H ′ be such that (h,h′)˜Rck(h
′′,h′)
for all h′′ ∈ H ′. Then, match ck with (h,h′) and s′ to the hospital that has a remaining
vacancy.
Let µ be the outcome of Algorithm 2. We show that µ is stable at
˜
P.
Assume for contradiction that µ is blocked by a hospital and a single doctor or a pair
of hospitals and a couple. We complete the proof by considering the two cases of
30 2.5. EXISTENCE OF STABLE MATCHING WITH STRONG CPI
Algorithm 2 separately.
Case 1. Suppose Case 1 of Algorithm 2 holds. First, we show that µ cannot be
blocked by (h,s) for some h ∈ H and s ∈ S. Assume for contradiction that some pair
(h,s) blocks µ . By the nature of Algorithm 2, all the doctors that propose before s are
ranked above s according to the SCPI P0. Moreover, for any c = { f ,m} ∈C, if f P0s,
then by SCPI, mP0s. Since s /∈ µ(h), by the nature of Algorithm 2, we have either
µ(s)
˜
Psh or dP0s for all d ∈ µ(h) and |µ(h)|= κh. Clearly, if µ(s)˜Psh then s does notblock with hospital h. On the other hand, if dP0s for all d ∈ µ(h) and |µ(h)| = κh,
then by responsiveness of hospitals’ preferences, we have µ(h)
˜
Ph(µ(h) \ d)∪ s for
all d ∈ µ(h). Therefore, hospital h does not block with s. This contradicts that (h,s)
blocks µ .
Next we show that µ can not be blocked by ((h1,h2),c) for some h1,h2 ∈ H and
c = { f ,m} ∈ C. Note that, we can not have |{d ∈ D : dP0m} < κh for all h. This
is because, if all the hospitals have enough vacancies to accommodate the couple
members, c would not get rejected by any pair of hospitals it applies to and thus, the
c would be matched to their top ranked pair of hospitals. Which implies that c cannot
block µ .
Therefore, by the nature of Algorithm 2, couple c proposes to (h1,h2) before
proposing to (µ( f ),µ(m)), and some hospital, say hi ∈ {h1,h2}, rejects at least one
member of the couple c. We distinguish the following two sub-cases.
Case 1.1. Suppose h1 6= h2. Since hi rejects a doctor from couple c, it must be that
hi has no vacancies when c proposes to (h1,h2). Because f and m are adjacent in P0,
this means all the doctors in hi are preferred to both f and m. Therefore, hi will be
worse off by removing a doctor from µ(hi) and taking a member from the couple c.
This contradicts that ((h1,h2),c) blocks µ .
Case 1.2. Suppose h1 = h2. Because h1 rejects at least one member of c, it must
be that h1 has less than two vacancies when c proposes to (h1,h1). Let D′ be the set
of doctors that are present in h1 at the time when c makes the proposal to (h1,h1).
By SCPI and the nature Algorithm 2, this means each doctor in D′ is preferred to
both the doctors of the couple c. Again, by the nature of Algorithm 2, it follows that
D′ ⊆ µ(h1). This means h1 must release some doctors from D′ in order to block with
c. Therefore, h1 will be worse off by removing a doctor from D′ in order to take a
member of the couple. This contradicts that ((h1,h1),c) blocks µ .
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This completes the proof of Case 1 of Theorem 2.2.
Case 2. Suppose Case 2 of Algorithm 2 holds. Note that after matching all the
doctors from the top till fk in P0, we have exactly three vacancies left. To see this,
recall that each couple and each single doctor prefer to be matched to any hospital
than being unmatched. Therefore, all the doctors ranked above fk will be matched
to some hospital. Since ∑h∈H κh = |D|, it follows that total number of remaining
vacancies in hospitals in H ′ is 3.
Note that, by similar argument as for Case 1, (i) µ cannot be blocked by (h,s) for any
sP0 fk, and (ii) µ cannot be blocked by ((h1,h2),c) for any c such that c 6= ck.
First, we show µ cannot be blocked by (h,s′), where s′ is the unique single doctor in-
between fk and mk. Suppose not. Since dP0s′ for all d 6=mk, it follows that h∈H ′. By
Algorithm 2, µ(s′) ∈ H ′ and µ(mk) is the worst hospital in H ′ according to ˜Ps′ . Sinceµ is blocked by (h,s′), we have h
˜
Ps′µ(s′)˜
Rs′µ(mk). This means h 6= µ(mk). We now
show that h 6= µ( fk). Assume for contradiction, h = µ( fk). By our earlier argument,
since h 6= µ(mk), µ( fk) = µ(mk) implies h 6= µ( fk). Suppose µ( fk) 6= µ(mk). This
means all the doctors in µ( fk) are ranked above s′ according to P0, contradicting the
fact that µ( fk) and s′ block µ . This shows h 6= µ( fk). By the definition of Algorithm
2, h ∈ {µ(s′),µ( fk),µ(mk)}. Since h /∈ {µ( fk),µ(mk)}, it must be that h = µ(s′),
and hence h and s′ can not block.
Now, we show that µ cannot be blocked by ((h1,h2),ck) for some h1,h2 ∈ H. Since
dP0 fk for all d /∈ {s′,mk}, it follows from Algorithm 2 and the definition of H ′ that
h1,h2 ∈ H ′. We complete the proof by distinguishing the following two cases.
Case 2.1. Suppose h2 = µ(mk). By Algorithm 2, µ(ck)˜
Rck(h1,h2) for all h1 ∈ H ′.
Therefore, ck will not block with (h1,h2).
Case 2.2. Suppose h2 6= µ(mk). By Algorithm 2, this means all the doctors in h2 are
preferred to mk according to P0. Therefore, h2 will not block with mk.
This completes the proof of Case 2 of Theorem 2.2.
Since Case 1 and Case 2 are exhaustive, this completes the proof of Theorem 2.2.
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Now, we look at the converse of Theorem 2.2. It states the following: If hospitals’
preferences satisfy CPI but violates SCPI, then there always exists an unrestricted
extension of P0 at which there is no stable matching.
However, we prove a stronger version of this converse, where we show that when
hospitals’ preferences satisfy CPI but violates SCPI, one can find even an RVT exten-
sion of P0 where there is no stable matching. Thus, under the said assumption, one
does not have to look for an unrestricted extension to get hold of a profile with no
stable matching.
Theorem 2.3. Let hospitals’ preferences satisfy CPI with respect to P0. If P0 does
not satisfy SCPI, then there always exists an RVT extension of P0 at which there is no
stable matching.
Proof. Suppose a CPI P0 does not satisfy SCPI. We show that there exists an RVT
extension of P0 with no stable matching. Since P0 does not satisfy SCPI, one of the
following two cases must happen:
Case 1. There is a couple c= { f ,m} such that r(m,P0) 6= |D|, |{d ∈D : f P0dP0m}|>
0 and |{d ∈ D : dP0m}| ≥ κh for some h ∈ H. Thus, there exist doctors d1,d2 such
that f P0d1P0mP0d2 and a hospital h1 such that |{d ∈ D : dP0m}| ≥ κh1 .
Case 2. There is a couple c = { f ,m} such that r(m,P0) = |D| and
|{d ∈ D : f P0dP0m}| > 1. In other words, there exist doctors d1,d2 such that
f P0d1P0d2P0m.
In the following, we present an RVT extension of P0 with no stable matching for both
Case 1 and Case 2.
Take hospitals h1,h2 ∈ H and consider a preference profile ˜P such that
1. r1(˜
Pf ) = r1(˜
Pd2) = h2 and r1(˜
Pm) = r1(˜
Pd1) = h1,
2. r2(˜
Pf ) = r2(˜
Pd2) = h1 and r2(˜
Pm) = r2(˜
Pd1) = h2,
3. (h1,h1)˜
Pc(h2,h1) and (h1,h1)˜
Pc(h2,h2),
4. (h1,h2)˜
Pc(h,h′) for all h,h′ ∈ H such that (h,h′) does not belong to the set
{(h1,h1),(h2,h2),(h2,h1),(h1,h2)},
5. preference
˜
Pc satisfies responsiveness for all pairs of hospitals other than
(h1,h1),
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6. preferences of all couples other than c satisfy responsiveness,
7. |{d : r1(˜Pd) = h1 and dP
0m}|= κh1 −1, and
8. for all d /∈ { f ,m,d1,d2}, |{d : r1(˜Pd) = h2}|= κh2 −2 and |{d : r1(˜Pd) = h}|=κh for all h 6= h1,h2.
Note that the assumption made in condition 7 is possible as |{d ∈ D : dP0m}| = κh1
and f P0m. However, r1(˜
Pf ) 6= h1. We show that there is no stable matching at ˜Pfor both Case 1 and Case 2. Assume for contradiction that µ is a stable matching
at
˜
P. Note that by the construction of
˜
P, for all doctors d such that dP0 f , we must
have µ(d) = r1(˜
Pd). In the following claim, we show that µ(d) ∈ {h1,h2} for all
d ∈ { f ,m,d1,d2}.
Claim 2.1. For all d ∈ { f ,m,d1,d2}, µ(d) ∈ {h1,h2}.
Proof. First, we show µ(d) ∈ {h1,h2} for d ∈ { f ,m}. Suppose µ(d) = h′ for some
d ∈ { f ,m} and some h′ /∈ {h1,h2}. We complete the proof for the case where µ(m) =
h′, the same for the case µ( f ) = h′ follows from similar arguments. Let µ(c) = (h,h′)
for some h ∈ H. Consider the matchings (h,h1) and (h,h2) of the couple c. Note that
by responsiveness, (h,h1)˜
Pc(h,h′) and (h,h2)˜
Pc(h,h′). Further, since ∑h∈H κh = |D|
and µ(d) = r1(˜
Pd) for all doctors d such that dP0 f , µ(m) = h′ implies that there
must be a doctor d′ with mP0d′ such that either d′ ∈ µ(h1) or d′ ∈ µ(h2). This
means couple c blocks µ with either (h,h1) or (h,h2) contradicting the stability of µ .
Therefore, µ(d) ∈ {h1,h2} for all d ∈ { f ,m}.
Now, we show µ(d) ∈ {h1,h2} for d ∈ {d1,d2}. Suppose µ(d) = h′ for some d ∈
{d1,d2} and some h′ /∈ {h1,h2}. Since µ(d) ∈ {h1,h2} for all d ∈ { f ,m} and µ(d) =
r1(˜
Pd) for all doctors d such that dP0 f , there must be a doctor d′ with d2P0d′ such
that either d′ ∈ µ(h1) or d′ ∈ µ(h2). Because rk(˜Pd) ∈ {h1,h2} for all k = 1,2, ifµ(d′) = h1, then d blocks µ with h1, and if µ(d′) = h2, then d blocks µ with h2. This
contradicts the stability of µ . Therefore, µ(d) ∈ {h1,h2} for all d ∈ {d1,d2}.
This completes the proof of Claim 1.
Now, we distinguish the following cases depending on the allocation of couple c and
show that µ is not stable for each of these cases.
• Suppose µ(c) = (h1,h1).
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Since |{d : r1(˜Pd) = h1 and dP
0 f}|= κh1 −2 and f P0d1, thus d1 /∈ µ(h1). Be-
cause h1˜
Pd1h2 and d1P
0m, this means (h1,d1) blocks µ .
• Suppose µ(c) = (h2,h1).
Then, ((h1,h1),c) blocks µ as f P0d1P0d2 and (h1,h1)˜
Pc(h2,h1).
• Suppose µ(c) = (h2,h2).
By the construction of
˜
P, (h1,h1)˜
Pc(h2,h2) and h2˜
Pd2h1. If Case 1 holds, then
((h1,h1),c) blocks µ as f P0d1 and mP0d2. On the other hand, if Case 2 holds,
then (h2,d2) blocks µ as d2P0m.
• Suppose µ(c) = (h1,h2).
Since h2˜
Pf h1, by RVT, (h2,h2)˜
Pc(h1,h2). This, together with the fact that
f P0d1P0d2, means µ is blocked by ((h2,h2),c).
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.3.
The following corollary is immediate from Theorem 2.2 and (the stronger version of)
Theorem 2.3.
Corollary 2.1. Let hospitals’ preferences satisfy CPI with respect to P0. Then a
stable matching is guaranteed at every unrestricted extension of P0 if and only if P0
satisfies SCPI.
2.6 Matching market with non-identical hospital pref-
erences
In both sections 2.4 and 2.5, we have assumed that the hospitals have identical prefer-
ences over the doctors. In this section, we explore the situations where this condition
is relaxed. From Example 2.1, we know that a stable matching does not exist under
CPI, when couples’ preferences satisfy RVT. However, to strengthen Theorem 2.1,
in the case when hospitals do not have CPI, we first show by means of the following
example that if hospitals’ preferences do not satisfy CPI and couples’ preferences
satisfy RVT, then stable matching might not exist at every preference profile.
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Example 2.2. Consider the matching problem where H = {h1,h2,h3} with κh1 =
κh2 = κh3 = 2, D = { f ,m,s1,s2,s3,s4}, and there is exactly one couple c = { f ,m} in
C.
The preferences of the hospitals over individual doctors and those of the individual
doctors and the couple are given in Table 2.2. The couple’s preference over pairs of
hospitals where one member is matched and the other one is unmatched is not shown
in the table, but assumed to be responsive and ranked below the shown pairs.
Ph1 Ph2 Ph3 Ps1 Ps2 Ps3 Ps4 Pf Pm Pc
s3 s4 s3 h2 h3 h1 h2 h1 h2 (h1,h2)
s4 s3 s4 h1 h1 h2 h1 h3 h1 (h1,h1)
s1 f m h3 h2 h3 h3 h2 h3 (h1,h3)
f m f (h3,h3)
m s1 s1 (h3,h2)
s2 s2 s2 (h3,h1)
(h2,h2)
(h2,h1)
(h2,h3)
Table 2.2: Non-Identical Hospital Preferences
We show that there is no stable matching at this preference profile. Assume for con-
tradiction that µ is a stable matching at that profile. Since µ is stable, r1(Ps3) = h1 and
r1(Ph1) = s3 imply µ(s3) = h1. Using similar logic, stability of µ implies µ(s4) = h2.
Moreover, because s1Phs2 for all h ∈ H, we must have µ(s1)Rs1 µ(s2). Now, we con-
sider all possible cases of couples’ matching satisfying the above criteria and show
that µ is blocked in each of those cases.
• Suppose µ(c) = (h1,h2). Since h1Ps1h3 and s1Ph1 f , µ is blocked by (h1,s1).
• Suppose µ(c) = (h1,h3). Since (h1,h2)Pc(h1,h3) and mPh2s1, µ is blocked by
((h1,h2),c).
• Suppose µ(c) = (h3,h3). Since (h1,h2)Pc(h3,h3), mPh2s1, and f Ph1s2, µ is
blocked by ((h1,h2),c).
• Suppose µ(c) = (h3,h) for some h ∈ {h1,h2}. Since (h3,h3)Pc(h3,h) and
mPh3s2, µ is blocked by ((h3,h3),c).
• Suppose µ(c) = (h2,h1). Since h1Ps1h3 and s1Ph1m, µ is blocked by (h1,s1).
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• Suppose µ(c) = (h2,h3). Since (h3,h3)Pc(h2,h3) and f Ph3s2, µ is blocked by
((h3,h3),c).
Therefore, there is no stable matching at the preference profile given in Table 2.2.
In view of Example 2.2, we look for restrictions on a preference profile in order to
assure the existence of stable matching when hospitals can have different preferences
over doctors. We find two natural candidates for this purpose as (i) the responsive for
F property of couples’ preferences and (ii) common preference over couple members.
Recall that a collection of preferences P0C satisfies responsive for F property if for all
c = { f ,m} ∈C and all h,h′ ∈ H, (h,h)P0c (h′,h) implies hP0f h′.
Common preference over couple members is a condition on hospitals’ preferences. It
says that, for every couple, each hospital prefers the member from F to the member
from M. Below, we provide a formal definition.
By P0H , we denote a collection of preferences {P0h }h∈H of hospitals in H.
Definition 2.11. A collection of preferences P0H = {P0h }h∈H of hospitals is said to
satisfy Common Preference over Couple members (CPC) if f P0h m for all c= { f ,m} ∈
C and all h ∈ H.
Although we find responsive for F property of couples’ preferences and CPC property
of hospitals’ preferences natural candidates for ensuring a stable matching at every
profile, Example 2.2 shows they are not sufficient. In view of this, we proceed to
strengthen the responsive for F property of couples’ preferences. We do this by intro-
ducing the notion of almost everywhere responsiveness. This is a restriction on the
preferences of non-single doctors and couples. A verbal description of this restriction
is given below which is followed by a formal definition.
Take a couple c = { f ,m} and consider an RVT preference P0c of the couple c. Then,
P0c satisfies almost everywhere responsiveness property if it satisfies responsiveness
over all pairs of hospitals except (r1(P0f ),r1(P
0
f )) and it violates responsiveness for
togetherness only when both members of the couple get a position at r1(P0f ). Note
that this means couples’ preferences satisfy responsiveness with respect to P0f , and
hence it implies responsive for F property.
Recall that by P0C , we denote a collection of preferences of non-single doctors and
couples such that P0c satisfies RVT for each couple c.
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Definition 2.12. A collection of preferences P0C satisfies almost everywhere respon-
siveness property (AER) if for all c = { f ,m} ∈C, there exists a responsive preference
Pc with respect to P0f and P
0
m such that for all pairs of hospitals (h1,h2),(h3,h4) ∈
(H¯×H¯)\(r1(P0f ),r1(P0f )), we have (h1,h2)Pc(h3,h4) if and only if (h1,h2)P0c (h3,h4).
For a given collection of preferences (P0C ,P
0
H), an extension of (P
0
C ,P
0
H) refers to any
preference profile where the preferences of couples and doctors in couples are as in
P0C and the preferences of hospitals are as in P
0
H .
The following theorem shows that the existence of a stable matching is guaranteed
at a preference profile if hospitals’ preferences satisfy CPC and couples preferences
satisfy AER.
Theorem 2.4. For a given collection of preferences (P0C ,P
0
H), a stable matching is
guaranteed at every extension of (P0,P0H) if P
0
H satisfies CPC and P
0
C satisfies AER.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 2.4 is constructive. Suppose (P0M,F,C,P
0
H) satisfies CPC
and AER property. We show that every extension
˜
P of (P0M,F,C,P
0
H) has a stable match-
ing.
Take an extension
˜
P of (P0M,F,C,P
0
H). For a given couple c = { f ,m} and a given
hospital h ∈ H, define the conditional preference of m given h, denoted by P0m|h, as an
element of L(H¯) such that h′P0m|hh
′′ if and only if (h,h′)P0c (h,h′′). Let r1(P0f ) is equal
to h f .
In the following, we present an algorithm that produces a stable matching at
˜
P.
Algorithm 3: Use DPDA where every single doctor s ∈ S proposes according to
˜
Ps and for every couple c = { f ,m}, f proposes according to P0f and m proposes
according to P0m|h f .
Let µ be the outcome of Algorithm 3. The following lemma is straight forward,
however for the sake of completeness, we provide its proof.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose a doctor d is rejected by a hospital h at some stage of Algorithm
3. Then, (h,d) cannot block µ .
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Proof. Since h rejected d during some stage of Algorithm 3, it must be that hospital
h had κh many proposals from doctors that are better than d according to P0h at the
time when h rejected d. Therefore, by the nature of DPDA, all the doctors that are
matched to h at the end of Algorithm 3 must be better than d according to P0h . So, h
will not block with d. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Now, we show that µ is stable at
˜
P.
First, we show that µ cannot be blocked by (h,s) for some h ∈ H and s ∈ S. Assume
for contradiction that some pair (h,s) blocks µ . Since s /∈ µ(h), this means either
µ(s)
˜
Psh or s was rejected by h at some stage of the algorithm. Clearly, if µ(s)˜
Psh
then s does not block with h. On the other hand, if s proposed to h and was rejected
by h at an earlier stage, then by Lemma 2.1, (h,s) cannot block µ .
Now, we show that µ cannot be blocked by ((h1,h2),c) for some h1,h2 ∈H and c∈C.
Assume for contradiction that ((h1,h2),c) blocks µ for some h1,h2 ∈ H and c ∈ C.
We distinguish the following two cases.
Case 1. Suppose µ( f ) = h f .
First, we show that µ(m) 6= h2. To the contrary, suppose µ(m) = h2. By the
AER property, (h1,h2)P0c (h f ,h2) implies h1P
0
f h f , which contradicts the fact that
h f = r1(P0f ).
Next, we show that (h f ,h2)P0c (h f ,µ(m)). Since ((h1,h2),c) blocks µ and µ( f ) = h f ,
(h1,h2)P0c (h f ,µ(m)). Therefore, if h1 = h f , then there is nothing to prove. Sup-
pose h1 6= h f . Then, by the AER property, we have (h f ,h2)P0c (h1,h2). Since
(h1,h2)P0c (h f ,µ(m)) and µ(m) 6= h2, this implies (h f ,h2)P0c (h f ,µ(m)).
Now, we show that ((h f ,h2),c) cannot block µ . Since ((h1,h2),c) blocks µ and
µ( f ) = h f , it follows that ((h f ,h2),c) also blocks µ . By the definition of P0m|h f ,
(h f ,h2)P0c (h f ,µ(m)) implies h2P0m|h f µ(m). Therefore, by the definition of Algorithm
3, it must be that m proposed to h2 and got rejected at an earlier stage of Algorithm
3. Hence, by Lemma 2.1, ((h f ,h2),c) cannot block µ . This completes the proof for
Case 1.
Case 2. Suppose µ( f ) 6= h f .
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Since Algorithm 3 uses DPDA where f proposes according to P0f , by the property
of DPDA, f cannot block according to the preference P0f . This, together with the
fact that ((h1,h2),c) blocks µ , which in particular means that h1 blocks with f , im-
plies µ( f )R0f h1. Since r1(P
0
f ) = h f and µ( f ) 6= h f , we have h f P0f µ( f ). Because
µ( f )R0f h1, this means h1 6= h f . By the AER property, P0c is responsive over all
pairs of hospitals except (h f ,h f ). As µ( f )R0f h1, (h1,h2)P
0
c (µ( f ),µ(m)) and the
AER property imply h2 = h f or h2P0mµ(m). Because µ( f ) 6= h f , it must be that
|µ(h f )| = κh f and dP0h f f for all d ∈ µ(h f ). Since f P0h m for all h ∈ H by the CPC
property, this means dP0h f m for all d ∈ µ(h f ). Therefore, µ(m) 6= h f . Moreover,
since ((h1,h2),c) blocks µ and dP0h f m for all d ∈ µ(h f ), it follows that h2 6= h f .
Thus, we have h2P0mµ(m) which implies h2 6= µ(m). Since µ(m),h2,h f are all dis-
tinct, h2P0mµ(m) implies h2P0m|h f µ(m). So, it must be that m proposed to h2 and got
rejected at an earlier stage of the algorithm. By Lemma 2.1, this means ((h1,h2),c)
cannot block µ . This completes the proof for Case 2.
Since Case 1 and Case 2 are exhaustive, this completes the proof of Theorem 2.4.
In the following examples, we show that the conditions CPC and AER are almost
necessary for Theorem 2.4. In particular, we show that there always exists a prefer-
ence extension with no stable matching if a preference profile satisfies one of the two
conditions and violates the other ‘slightly’ (in an appropriate sense).
Example 2.3. In this example, we show that if a preference profile satisfies CPC
but violates AER slightly, then there exists a preference extension with no stable
matching.
Consider the matching problem where the set of hospitals, their capacities, and the
set of doctors are as given in Example 2.3. The preferences of the hospitals over
individual doctors and those of the individual doctors and the couple are given in
Table 2.3. The couple’s preference over pairs of hospitals where one member is
matched and the other one is unmatched is not shown in the table, but assumed to be
responsive and ranked below the shown pairs. Note that the hospitals’ preferences
satisfy CPC but couple’s preference does not satisfy AER. Further, note that this is a
slight violation of AER, because responsiveness is violated in order for the couple to
be together only at the second ranked hospital according to Pf .
The proof of the fact that there is no stable matching at the preference profile in Table
2.3 is similar to that for the case of Example 2.2, and hence is omitted.
40
2.6. MATCHING MARKET WITH NON-IDENTICAL HOSPITAL
PREFERENCES
Ph1 Ph2 Ph3 Ps1 Ps2 Ps3 Ps4 Pf Pm Pc
s3 s4 s3 h2 h3 h1 h2 h1 h2 (h1,h2)
s4 s3 s4 h1 h1 h2 h1 h3 h1 (h1,h1)
s1 f f h3 h2 h3 h3 h2 h3 (h1,h3)
f m m (h3,h3)
m s1 s1 (h3,h2)
s2 s2 s2 (h3,h1)
(h2,h2)
(h2,h1)
(h2,h3)
Table 2.3: Violation of AER under CPC
Example 2.4. In this example, we show that if a preference profile satisfies AER
but violates CPC slightly, then there exists a preference extension with no stable
matching.
Consider the matching problem where H = {h1,h2} with κh1 = κh2 = 2, D =
{ f ,m,s1,s2}, and there is exactly one couple c = { f ,m} in C. The preferences of
the hospitals over individual doctors, and those of the individual doctors and the cou-
ple are given in Table 2.4. The couple’s preference over pairs of hospitals where
one member is matched and the other one is unmatched is not shown in the table,
but assumed to be responsive and ranked below the shown pairs. Note that, couple’s
preference satisfies AER but hospitals’ preferences do not satisfy CPC. Further, note
that this is a slight variation from CPC, because the relative position of the members
of the couple is switched and the ranking of single doctors remains the same in both
the hospitals.
Ph1 Ph2 Ps1 Ps2 Pf Pm Pc
m f h1 h2 h1 h2 (h1,h1)
s1 s1 h2 h1 h2 h1 (h1,h2)
f m (h2,h2)
s2 s2 (h2,h1)
Table 2.4: Violation of CPC under AER
We show that there is no stable matching at this preference profile. Assume for con-
tradiction that µ is a stable matching at that profile. Now, we consider all possible
cases of couple’s matching and show that µ is blocked in each of those cases.
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• Suppose µ(c) = (h1,h1). Since h1Ps1h2 and s1Ph1 f , µ is blocked by (h1,s1).
• Suppose µ(c) = (h1,h2). Since (h1,h1)Pc(h1,h2) and mPh1s1Ph1s2, µ is
blocked by ((h1,h1),c).
• Suppose µ(c) = (h2,h2). Since (h1,h1)Pc(h2,h2), mPh1s1, and f Ph1s2, µ is
blocked by ((h1,h1),c).
• Suppose µ(c) = (h2,h1). Since (h2,h2)Pc(h2,h1), (h1,h1)Pc(h2,h1), f Ph1s2
and mPh2s2, µ(s2) = h1 implies ((h1,h1),c) blocks µ and µ(s2) = h2 implies
((h2,h2),c) blocks µ .
Therefore, there is no stable matching at the preference profile given in Table 2.4.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have considered many-to-one matching problems between doc-
tors and hospitals where doctors consist of some couples. First, we have considered
the case where the hospitals have a common preference over individual doctors. We
have shown that when a couple is allowed to violate responsiveness only for togeth-
erness, a stable matching exists at every preference profile if and only if the lesser
preferred member (according to the common preference of the hospitals) of the cou-
ple is ready to violate responsiveness to be together with the more preferred member.
We have further provided necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a
stable matching at every preference profile when a couple is allowed to violate re-
sponsiveness arbitrarily.
Next, we have considered the case where hospitals need not have a common prefer-
ence over individual doctors. We have shown that if couples’ preferences satisfy the
almost everywhere responsive property and hospitals’ preferences satisfy common
preference over couples property, then a stable matching exists at every preference
profile.
An interesting open problem would be to consider the situation where (i) hospitals are
partitioned based on geographical regions (i.e., hospitals in the same geographical
region are in one partition) and (ii) couples’ preferences violate responsiveness in
order for them to be employed at hospitals that are located in the same region. It
follows from Theorem 2.2 that a stable matching will exist in this model if hospitals
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preferences satisfy SCPI. However, SCPI need not be a necessary condition for the
existence of stable matching in this case since there is some structure in the way
couples’ preference can violate responsiveness. We leave the problem of finding the
exact necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable matching in this
model for future research.
CHAPTER 3
Stability in Matching with Couples having Responsive
Preferences
3.1 Introduction1
A huge literature has been developed on various market designs for finding an “op-
timal” matching procedure in a labour market. In many centralised labour markets,
stability is an important condition for optimality. We have already seen that a match-
ing is stable when there do not exist institution-individual pairs that are not matched
to each other, but when being matched are better off compared to their present allo-
cation.
Kelso and Crawford (1982), Roth (1985), Alkan and Gale (2003) and Hatfield and
Milgrom (2004) show that a sufficient amount of substitutability can guarantee the
1Although some of the notations, definitions and explanations are already discussed in the first two
chapters, we state them again for completeness.
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existence of a stable matching. These papers assume substitutability of preferences
of the hospitals over sets of doctors. Later, Klaus and Klijn (2005) assume respon-
siveness of couples’ preferences over ordered pairs of hospitals and show that the
existence of a stable matching is guaranteed in such settings. Responsiveness means
that unilateral improvements according to the preference of one couple member are
beneficial for the couple.
As in previous chapters, we assume here that the institutions are hospitals and the in-
dividuals are doctors, where the subset of doctors includes couples. We assume that
couples’ preferences are responsive over the pair of hospitals and hospitals’ prefer-
ences are responsive over the set of doctors.
Note that given the individual preferences of the couple members, more than one
(joint) couple preference satisfies responsiveness. For example, suppose we have a
couple c = { f ,m} and two hospitals h1 and h2 such that f prefers h1 to h2 but m
prefers h2 to h1. Suppose further that (x,y) denotes an allocation of this couple where
f is matched with x and m is matched with y. Then we know by responsiveness
that (h1,h2) is preferred to both (h1,h1) and (h2,h2) whereas, (h1,h1) and (h2,h2)
are both preferred to (h2,h1). However, responsiveness does not give us an ordering
between the pairs (h1,h1) and (h2,h2). Thus there are different complete responsive
couple preference extensions. Similarly, given a preference of a hospital over doctors,
we can have more than one responsive preference over subsets of doctors.
Allowing for complete responsive preferences for both couples of doctors and hospi-
tals is not innocuous, as in such situations stable matchings may fail to exist. On the
other hand, allowing that the pairs (h1,h1) and (h2,h2) are comparable in the above
mentioned example of couple preference seems to be natural. Similarly, it seems
natural that hospitals admitting teams of doctors compare, for instance, two pairs of
doctors, where in one pair, there is one A ranked doctor and one C ranked doctor, and
in the other pair there are two B ranked doctors. As we will see, allowing for such
comparisons does affect the stability of matchings. Also, it is worthwhile to mention
that by a standard replication of hospitals up to their capacities to create a one-to-
one matching, these pairs of doctors are actually considered incomparable. This is
because, for the hospital the B ranked doctor is better than the C ranked doctor but
is worse than the A ranked doctor. Thus, replication implies that these two sets of
doctors are incomparable. This is the main reason why results presented here differ
from Klaus and Klijn (2005), who found stable matchings in every case of couples’
responsive preferences.
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In this chapter, we formalize our idea of complete responsive preferences of hospitals
and couples and study its consequences for the existence of a stable matching.
First, we show by means of an example that stable matchings may not exist at ar-
bitrary responsive preference profiles. Then, we provide a condition on couples’
preferences that is necessary and sufficient for guaranteeing the existence of a stable
matching for every responsive extension of hospitals’ preferences over sets of doc-
tors. We call this condition extreme-altruism. We explain this condition by means of
the following example. Suppose that there are k hospitals {h1, . . . ,hk} and a couple.
Suppose further that hi is preferred to h j for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k by both members of the
couple. Then, extreme-altruism says that, for any 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, the couple prefers
the allocation where one member is matched with hi and the other is matched with hk
compared to the allocation where both of them are matched with h j.
Next, we provide conditions on hospitals’ preferences that are necessary and suffi-
cient for guaranteeing the existence of a stable matching for every responsive exten-
sion of couples’ preferences. We call this condition aversion to couple diversity. We
explain this condition by means of the following example. Consider a hospital h with
preference Ph over individual doctors. Let c = { f ,m} be a couple and let d,d′ be
two other doctors (possibly another couple). Suppose that f PhdPhd′Phm. As we have
discussed earlier, responsiveness does not put any restriction on h’s preference over
the relative ordering of the sets of doctors { f ,m} and {d,d′}. A hospital is averse
of diverse couples if in such situations it prefers {d,d′} to { f ,m}. Loosely put, this
property asserts that a hospital does not like to employ couples whose members are
relatively more dissimilar (with respect to its preference over individual doctors).
Another important contribution in this chapter is that, not only we characterise pro-
files where stable matchings exist, but we also provide algorithms that produce a
stable matching whenever that exists.
Thus, we feel that we provide a more complete picture on the issue of the existence
of stable matchings when hospitals and couples have responsive preferences, and
consequently complements the work of Klaus and Klijn (2005).
In the next section, we lay out the framework of our model and formally provide
all the necessary definitions. We state and describe an algorithm used for matching
doctors with hospitals, which we use throughout this chapter. In Section 3.3, we
provide an example showing that the existence of a stable matching is not guaranteed
at arbitrary responsive preferences profiles. In Section 3.4, we present conditions on
couples’ preferences that are necessary and sufficient for guaranteeing the existence
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of a stable matching for arbitrary responsive extensions hospitals’ preferences, and
in Section 3.5, we present conditions on hospitals’ preferences that are necessary and
sufficient for guaranteeing the existence of a stable matching for arbitrary responsive
extensions of couples’ preferences. We conclude with Section 3.6 where we explain
the difference between our work and Klaus and Klijn (2005) by means of a formal
example.
3.2 The framework
We consider many-to-one matchings between doctors and hospitals. We denote by H
a finite set of hospitals. Each hospital h ∈ H has a finite capacity, denoted by κh.
We denote by D a finite set of doctors. We assume that D = M∪F ∪S where F,M,S
are pairwise disjoint sets with |M|= |F |. Here, the doctors in F and M together form
fixed couples. Also, the doctors in S are those who are not part of any couple. We
denote the set of couples by C = {{ f1,m1},{ f2,m2}, . . .} and a generic couple by
c = { f ,m}. We denote by λ /∈ H, a dummy hospital which we use to represent a
doctor being unemployed.
Throughout this chapter, we assume |H| ≥ 2, |D| ≥ 4, |C| ≥ 1, and κh ≥ 2 for all
h ∈ H and κλ = |D|.
For notational convenience, we do not always use braces for denoting singleton hos-
pitals, doctors or couples.
3.2.1 Matching
Definition 3.1. A matching µ is a correspondence from H ∪{λ} to D such that for
all h ∈ H, |µ(h)| ≤ κh. Moreover µ(h1)∩µ(h2) = /0 for any h1,h2 ∈ H with h1 6= h2.
For ease of notation, whenever d ∈ µ(h) for some d ∈ D and h ∈ H, we write µ(d) =
h. We say that a doctor is matched with λ to mean that the doctor is unemployed.
More formally, if d /∈ µ(h) for all h ∈ H, then µ(d) = λ . For a couple c = { f ,m} ∈C
and for hospitals h,h′ ∈ H ∪ {λ}, we write µ(c) = (h,h′) to mean µ( f ) = h and
µ(m) = h′. Further, for a hospital h ∈ H and a matching µ , we say h has κh −|µ(h)|
vacant positions at µ .
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3.2.2 Preferences
In this section, we introduce the notion of preferences of doctors and hospitals, and
present some restrictions on them.
For a set X , we denote by L(X) the set of linear orders on X , i.e., complete, reflexive,
transitive, and antisymmetric binary relations over X . An element of L(X) is called
a preference (over X). For any i ∈ H ∪D∪C, Ri denotes a preference of i and Pi
denotes its strict part. Since a preference is antisymmetric xRiy implies either x = y
or xPiy. We say x is weakly preferred to y to mean xRiy, and x is (strictly) preferred
to y to mean xPiy. For Pi ∈ L(X) and k ≤ |X |, we define the k-th ranked element in Pi,
denoted by rk(Pi), as follows: rk(Pi) = x ∈ X if |{y ∈ X : yRix}|= k.
Preferences of hospitals
For any hospital h ∈ H, let Dh be the set of acceptable doctors. A preference of
hospital h, denoted by P¯h, is a linear order over Dh. Thus, P¯h ∈ L(Dh). A hospital
prefers to have any doctor from this set of acceptable doctors, over having a vacant
spot. Similarly, a hospital prefers to have a vacant spot to having doctors which do not
belong to the set of acceptable doctors. We assume that the dummy hospital λ finds
all doctors acceptable. Thus, Dλ = D. Also, λ is indifferent between all doctors.
For any hospital h ∈ H, a preference P¯h over individual doctors is extended to a pref-
erence Ph over feasible subsets of acceptable doctors {D′ ⊆ Dh : |D′| ≤ κh}.
Definition 3.2. We say Ph ∈ L({D′ ⊆ Dh : |D′| ≤ κh}) is responsive if
(i) for all D′ ⊆ Dh with D′ 6= /0 and |D′| ≤ κh, D′Ph /0.
(ii) for all d,d′ ∈ Dh, {d}Rh{d′} if and only if dR¯hd′, and
(iii) for all D′,D′′ ⊆ Dh with |D′|< κh, |D′′|< κh and all d ∈ Dh \ (D′∪D′′), (D′∪
{d})Ph(D′′∪{d}) if and only if D′PhD′′.
Having define Ph over all feasible subsets of acceptable doctors, we extend this pref-
erence over the set of all feasible subsets of doctors {D′ ⊆ D : |D′| ≤ κh}.
Definition 3.3. For all D′ ⊆ D such that |D′| ≤ κh and D′ 6⊂ Dh, we have /0PhD′.
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For notational convenience, for any hospital h ∈ H, any couple c = { f ,m} ∈ C and
any doctor d ∈ D\{ f ,m}, dPhc means dPh f and dPhm.
Preferences of doctors and couples
A preference of a doctor d ∈ D, denoted by Pd , is an element of L(H ∪ {λ}). A
preference of a couple c= { f ,m} ∈C, denoted by Pc, is an element of L((H∪{λ})2).
We call a preference of a couple responsive if a unilateral improvement in the position
of one member of the couple is beneficial for the couple.
Definition 3.4. Let c = { f ,m} ∈ C be a couple. Let Pf be a preference of f and
Pm be a preference of m. A preference Pc ∈ L((H ∪{λ})2) of the couple c is called
responsive (with respect to Pf and Pm) if for all h,h1,h2 ∈ H ∪{λ}, we have
(i) (h1,h)Pc(h2,h) if and only if h1Pf h2, and
(ii) (h,h1)Pc(h,h2) if and only if h1Pmh2.
For any c = { f ,m} ∈ C, a responsive preference Pc induces unique marginal prefer-
ences Pf and Pm for f and m respectively.
Preference profiles and matching problems
A preference profile is a collection of responsive preferences for all hospitals in H, all
doctors in D and all couples in C. Thus, a preference profile P is a tuple of preferences
({Pd}d∈D,{Pc}c∈C,{Ph}h∈H), where for all d ∈ D, c ∈C and h ∈ H, Pd is a preference
of doctor d, Pc is a responsive preference of couple c, and Ph is a responsive preference
of hospital h over acceptable and feasible sets of doctors, respectively. Note that, for
any hospital h ∈ H, Dh is an inherent part of Ph. This means that a preference Ph
automatically specifies the acceptable set Dh of the hospital.
A matching problem is a tuple consisting of a set of hospitals with corresponding
capacities, a set of doctors with its partition into F , M, S, and a corresponding pref-
erence profile.
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3.2.3 Stability
There are different notions of stability based on different types of permissible block-
ing coalitions.
Let µ be a matching and P be a preference profile. We say a hospital h prefers to
have a set of doctors D′ (possibly empty) to a subset of doctors in µ(h) if there is
D′′ ⊆ µ(h) with D′∩D′′ = /0 such that {(µ(h)\D′′)∪D′}Phµ(h). Similarly, we say
a doctor d (or a couple c) prefers a hospital h to µ(d) (or a pair of hospitals (h,h′) to
µ(c)) if hPd µ(h) (or (h,h′)Pcµ(c)). Note that if a hospital prefers a set of doctors to
its assignment at µ , then by definition, that hospital is not matched with any of those
doctors at µ . Moreover, it could also be that h has some unacceptable doctors D′′ in
µ(h), thus h prefers D′ = /0 to µ(h).
Similarly, if a doctor (or a couple) prefers a hospital (or a pair of hospitals) to its as-
signment at µ , then that doctor (or at least one member of that couple) is not matched
with the hospital (or the corresponding hospital) at µ .
Now, we define the notion of blocking. Note that, since λ is indifferent between all
sets of doctors, and Dλ = D, thus λ always prefers to have any doctor than not having
that doctor. First, we introduce the notion of blocking between a hospital and a doctor
in S.
Definition 3.5. Let s ∈ S, h ∈ H ∪{λ} and let µ be a matching. Then (h,s) blocks µ
if h prefers s to µ(h) and s prefers h to µ(s).
Next, we define the notion of blocking between a pair of hospitals and a couple.
Definition 3.6. Let µ be a matching and let c = { f ,m} ∈ C and (h f ,hm) ∈
(H ∪{λ})2. Then, ((h f ,hm),c) blocks µ if c prefers (h f ,hm) to µ(c) and
(i) if h f 6= hm and µ( f ) 6= h f , then h f prefers f to µ(h f ),
(ii) if h f 6= hm and µ(m) 6= hm, then hm prefers m to µ(hm), and
(iii) if h f = hm, then h f prefers { f ,m} to µ(h f ).
An important thing to note about the notion of blocking here is that hospitals are
myopic in the sense that when they remove a member of a couple, they do not consider
the possibility of losing the other member of it. We consider this model as otherwise
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a farsighted notion of blocking would require a hospital to estimate the possibility
of losing the ‘other member’ by checking whether there is really any hospital for
that member to go (to be better off individually or by couple’s preference). Such a
notion will complicate the model considerably, and more importantly, doing so much
of calculations in order to decide who to appoint or remove is practically impossible
for big institutions like hospitals.
Thus, by allowing the notion of a hospital being interested in a couple, the blocking
definition takes complementarity of a couple being accepted into account. However,
the hospital does not take this into account while accepting single doctors at the cost
of removing a member of the couple from the hospital. The asymmetry arising here
is the main reason, why the results obtained in this chapter are different to the results
obtained by choice function approach in many-to-many matchings. 2
Whenever a matching µ is blocked by ((h f ,µ(m)),c) for some c = { f ,m} ∈ C and
some h f ∈ H ∪ {λ}, for ease of presentation we say that µ is blocked by (h f , f ).
Similarly we say that µ is blocked by (hm,m) if µ is blocked by ((µ( f ),hm),c).
Our next remark follows from the responsiveness of couples’ preferences and Defini-
tion 3.6.
Remark 3.1. Let µ be a matching and c = { f ,m} be a couple. Suppose for some x ∈
{ f ,m} and some hospital hx ∈ H, we have hxPxµ(x) and ((µ(hx)\d)∪{x})Phx µ(hx)
for some d ∈ µ(hx)\{ f ,m}, then (hx,x) blocks µ .
A matching is stable if it cannot be blocked by any blocking pair. More formally, we
get the following definition.
Definition 3.7. A matching µ is stable, if
(i) for all h ∈ H ∪λ and s ∈ S, (h,s) does not block µ ,
(ii) for all (h f ,hm) ∈ (H ∪λ )2 and c ∈C, ((h f ,hm),c) does not block µ , and
(iii) for all h ∈ H, (h, /0) does not block µ(h), i.e., h does not prefer /0 to µ(h).
Now, we define the concept of individual rationality.
Definition 3.8. A matching µ is individually rational if
2See Konishi and Ünver (2006), Echenique and Oviedo (2006), Hatfield and Kojima (2010), for notions
of stability in many-to-many matchings.
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(i) for all s ∈ S, µ(s)Rsλ ,
(ii) for all c ∈C, µ(c)Rc(λ ,λ ), and
(iii) for all h ∈ H and all d ∈ µ(h), d ∈ Dh.
The next remark follows from the definition of stability.
Remark 3.2. Every stable matching is individually rational.
3.2.4 Algorithm
In this section we present a well-known algorithm called doctor proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm (DPDA). This algorithm was introduced by Gale and Shap-
ley(1962). 3 Our proofs for the existence of stable matchings use a modification of
DPDA. In what follows, we give a very short description of this algorithm. Take a
profile P. Then, the DPDA algorithm at P goes as follows.
DPDA: In step 1 of the algorithm, all doctors simultaneously propose to their most
preferred hospitals. Each hospital h ∈ H provisionally accepts the most preferred
doctors according to Ph. If a hospital receives more than κh proposals, then it rejects
all the doctors which do not belong to its κh most preferred doctors. In any step k, the
unmatched doctors propose to their most preferred hospital from the remaining set of
hospitals who have not rejected them in any of the earlier steps. In any step of DPDA,
since any hospital h ∈ H accepts the most preferred collection of doctors according
to Ph, it may reject some doctors that it had provisionally accepted earlier. Hospitals
whose provisional list of accepted doctors is less than their maximum capacity can
still add to their accepted list if they receive fresh proposals. Thus the algorithm
terminates when each doctor is matched with some hospital or has been rejected by
all acceptable hospitals.
Remark 3.3. Note that in DPDA, each individual doctor proposes according to
his/her individual preference. Thus, couples’ preferences do not play any role in
this algorithm.
It is well-known that the outcome of DPDA is optimal for doctors. That is, some
doctor is worse off at every other stable matching. Moreover, by responsiveness and
the structure of DPDA, it follows that the outcome of DPDA is individually rational.
3See Knuth(1976), Gusfield and Irving(1989), Roth and Sotomayer(1990), Aldershof and Car-
ducci(1996) for additional results on stable matching problem in two sided matching.
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The following remark follows directly from the definition of DPDA.
Remark 3.4. Let µ be the outcome of DPDA. Let d /∈ µ(h) for some d ∈D and h∈H.
Then, hPd µ(d) implies d′Phd for all d′ ∈ µ(h).
In the following lemmas, we show that the outcome of DPDA cannot be blocked by
a hospital and a single doctor or by a pair of different hospitals and a couple. Some
of these results are well known outcomes of DPDA, but we prove them nevertheless
for the sake of completeness.
Lemma 3.1. The outcome of DPDA cannot be blocked by a pair (h,s) for any h ∈ H
and any s ∈ S.
Proof. Let µ be the outcome of DPDA. Assume for contradiction that (h,s) blocks
µ for some h ∈ H and some s ∈ S. Since the outcome of DPDA is individually
rational, sRhλ . Since hPsµ(s), by the definition of DPDA and Remark 3.4, either s
has not proposed to h during the DPDA or all the doctors in µ(h) are preferred to
s according to Ph. If s has not proposed to h during DPDA, then we have µ(s)Psh,
a contradiction to the fact that (h,s) blocks µ . So, suppose dPhs for all d ∈ µ(h).
Then, by responsiveness of hospitals’ preferences, we have µ(h)Ph((µ(h)\{d})∪ s)
for all d ∈ µ(h), and consequently, hospital h will not block with s. This completes
the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 3.2. The outcome of DPDA cannot be blocked by ((h1,h2),c) for any h1,h2 ∈
H such that h1 6= h2 and for any c ∈C.
Proof. Let µ be the outcome of DPDA. Assume for contradiction that µ is blocked
by ((h1,h2),c). Let µ( f ) = h f and µ(m) = hm. By the definition of a block,
(h1,h2)Pc(h f ,hm).
Suppose h f R f h1 and hmRmh2. Since (h1,h2) 6= (h f ,hm), this means
(h f ,hm)Pc(h1,h2), a contradiction. Now, suppose h1Pf h f or h2Pmhm. Without
loss of generality, assume h2Pmhm. Since the outcome of DPDA is individu-
ally rational, h2 6= λ . Because h2Pmhm, by Remark 3.4, m proposed to h2 at
some step of DPDA and got rejected. Since h1 6= h2, by Lemma 3.1, we have
µ(h2)Ph2((µ(h2) \ {d}) ∪ m) for all d ∈ µ(h2). However, this contradicts the
definition of a block.
In what follows, we give a lemma which shows that the outcome of DPDA cannot be
blocked by a pair of dummy hospitals and a couple.
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Lemma 3.3. The outcome of DPDA cannot be blocked by ((λ ,λ ),c) for any c ∈C.
Proof. Let µ be the outcome of DPDA. Assume for contradiction that µ is blocked
by ((λ ,λ ),c). Letµ( f ) = h f and µ(m) = hm. By the definition of block,
(λ ,λ )Pc(h f ,hm). By responsiveness, this means λPxhx for some x ∈ { f ,m}. How-
ever, by the definition of DPDA, λPxhx means x proposed to λ before proposing to
hx and got rejected. This is contradiction as, by our assumption, λ cannot reject a
doctor.
In the following lemmas, we give conditions when an outcome of DPDA cannot be
blocked by a pair of same hospitals and a couple.
Lemma 3.4. Suppose µ is an outcome of DPDA. Then for any h ∈ H and any c =
{ f ,m} ∈C,
(i) f Phm and hPf µ( f ) implies ((h,h),c) cannot block µ , and
(ii) mPh f and hPmµ(m) implies ((h,h),c) cannot block µ .
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that f Phm and hPf µ( f ). By the definition
of DPDA, f proposed to h and got rejected. By Remark 3.4, dPh f for all d ∈ µ(h).
Because f Phm, {d,d′}Ph{ f ,m} for all d,d′ ∈ µ(h). This means h cannot block µ
with c. This completes the proof.
Lemma 3.5. Suppose µ is an outcome of DPDA. Then for any h ∈ H and any c =
{ f ,m} ∈C, ((h,h),c) cannot block µ if h = µ(x) for some x ∈ { f ,m}
Proof. Without loss of generality, let h = µ( f ). Let ((h,h),c) block µ .
By the definition of a block, (h,h)Pc(µ( f ),µ(m)). Thus, by responsiveness of cou-
ples’ preferences, hP0mhm. By the definition of DPDA, this means m proposed to h
and got rejected. Since f ∈ µ(h), by Lemma 3.1 and the definition of block, we have
µ(h)Ph((µ(h) \ {d})∪m) for all d ∈ µ(h). This means h will not block µ with c,
which is a contradiction.
Remark 3.5. If a doctor d ∈ D and hospital h ∈ H are each other’s top ranked
alternative, then trivially for a stable match, they must be matched to each other.
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3.3 Stable matching is not guaranteed at arbitrary re-
sponsive profiles
In this section, we show by means of two examples that existence of a stable matching
is not guaranteed at arbitrary responsive preference profiles. The two examples are
slightly different to suit the subsequent sections.
Example 3.1. Let H = {h1,h2,h3}, κh = 2 for all h ∈ {h1,h2,h3}, and D =
{d1,d2,d3,d4, f ,m} where c = { f ,m} is a couple.
Suppose r1(Pd1) = h2 and r2(Pd1) = r1(Pd2) = h1. Further, r1(Pd3) = h2 and r1(Pd4) =
h3. For the couple, suppose h2Pf h1, h2Pf h3 and h1Pmh3 but (h1,h1)Pc(h2,h3). Finally
hPxλ for all x ∈ { f ,m} and all h ∈ H.
The above mentioned preferences along with the preferences of all the hospitals over
individuals are given in Table 3.1. The preference of all hospitals over pairs of doctors
can be any responsive preference over pairs of doctors. However { f ,m}Ph1{d1,d2}.
The couple’s preference over pairs of hospitals, where one member is matched and
the other one is unmatched are assumed to be responsive and ranked below the pairs
of hospitals.
Pd1 Pd2 Pd3 Pd4 Pf Pm Pc P¯h1 P¯h2 P¯h3
h2 h1 h2 h3
...
...
... d3 d3 d4
h1
...
...
... h2 h1 (h1,h1) d4 d4 d3
...
...
...
... f f d1
h1 h3 (h2,h3) d1 d1 f
...
...
... d2 m m
m d2 d2
Table 3.1: No Stable Matching under Responsive Preferences (Ex. 1)
The couple and h1 have responsive preferences. In what follows, we argue that there
is no stable matching for the preference profile given in Table 3.1.
Assume for contradiction, that there exists a stable matching µ for the given prefer-
ence profile. By Remark 3.5, it must be that µ(d3)= h2 and µ(d4)= h3, as the doctors
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and hospitals are each other’s top ranked alternative. Thus, there is potentially only
one vacancy to be filled in h2 and h3 respectively.
Particularly, it is not possible for the couple to be matched to (h2,h2) and (h3,h3)
for a stable matching. Also, since the couple prefers to be matched with any two
hospitals than having at least one member of the couple unmatched and we have
sufficiently many number of vacancies in all the three hospitals, thus, {µ( f ),µ(m)}⊆
{h1,h2,h3}.
Now we look at the following allocations of the couple in µ .
(i) Suppose µ(c) = (h2,h1).
Note that f Ph2d1. Since diP¯h1m for i ∈ {1,2}, r2(Pd1) = r1(Pd2) = h1. So,
µ(h2) = {d3, f}. As κh1 = 2, therefore di /∈ µ(h1) for some i. Thus, stability
of µ implies that (h1,di) blocks µ .
(ii) Suppose µ(c) = (h1,h1).
Then (h1,d2) blocks µ .
(iii) Suppose µ(c) = (h2,h3).
Since { f ,m}Ph1{d1,d2} and (h1,h1)Pc(h2,h3), ((h1,h1),c) blocks µ .
(iv) Suppose µ(c) = (h1,h3).
Since h2Pf h1, responsiveness implies (h2,h3)Pc(h1,h3). This together with the
fact that f P¯h2d1P¯h2d2 implies ((h2,h3),c) blocks µ .
(v) Suppose µ(c) = (h3,h1).
Since h2Pf h3, responsiveness implies (h2,h1)Pc(h3,h1). This together with the
fact that f P¯h2d1P¯h2d2 implies ((h3,h1),c) blocks µ .
(vi) Suppose µ(c) = (h,h2) for some h ∈ {h1,h3}.
Thus, d1 /∈ µ(h2). Since r1(Pd1) = h2 and d1Ph2m, stability of µ implies that
(h2,d1) blocks µ .
Cases (i)-(vi) together are exhaustive. Thus, it follows that there is no stable matching
for the given preference profile in Table 3.1.
Note that, the arguments of this example can also be used to give an example with
no stable matching when we consider h2 and h3 as the same hospital. Thus, we
just consider two vacancies for both the hospitals while excluding d3 and d4 from
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the set of doctors. It follows from the above argument that there does not exist a
stable matching when (h1,h1)Pc(h2,h2) with h2Pf h1, h1Pmh2 and the preferences of
hospitals over { f ,m,d1,d2} as given by P¯h1 and P¯h2 .
Example 3.2. Let H = {h1}, κh1 = 2 and D = {d1,d2, f ,m} where c = { f ,m} is a
couple.
The preference of the hospital over individuals and pairs of individuals, preference of
individual doctors and the couple preferences are given in Table 3.2.
The preference of h1 over the pairs of doctors where at least one position is vacant is
assumed to ranked below the shown pairs.
P¯h1 Pd1 Pd2 Pf Pm Pc Ph1
f h1 h1 λ h1 (λ ,h1) { f ,d1}
d1 λ λ h1 λ (h1,h1) { f ,d2}
d2 (λ ,λ ) { f ,m}
m (h1,λ ) {d1,d2}
{d1,m}
{d2,m}
Table 3.2: No Stable Matching under Responsive Preferences (Ex. 2)
Note that the couple and h1 have responsive preferences In what follows, we argue
that there is no stable matching for the preference profile given in Table 3.2.
Assume for contradiction, that there exists a stable matching µ for the given prefer-
ence profile. We look at the following allocations of the couple in µ .
(i) Suppose µ(c) = (λ ,h1).
Since diP¯h1m, r1(di) = h1 for i ∈ {1,2}, and κh1 = 2, therefore di /∈ µ(h1) for
some i. Thus, stability of µ implies that (h1,di) blocks µ .
(ii) Suppose µ(c) = (λ ,λ ).
Since { f ,m}Ph1{d1,d2} and (h1,h1)Pc(λ ,λ ), ((h1,h1),c) blocks µ .
(iii) Suppose µ(c) = (h1,h) for some h ∈ {h1,λ}.
Since r1(Pf ) = λ , it follows by responsiveness that ((λ ,h),c) blocks µ .
Since cases (i)-(iii) are exhaustive, it follows that there is no stable matching for the
given preference profile in Table 3.2.
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3.4 Conditions on couples’ preferences for stability
In view of Examples 3.1 and 3.2, we look for necessary and sufficient conditions
on couples’ preferences that guarantee the existence of a stable matching for every
profile.
Let P0C = ({P0c }c∈C) be a given profile of preferences of the couples. Thus, for any
c = { f ,m} ∈ C, and a given couple preference P0c , P0f and P0m denote the individual
preferences of f and m respectively. Since preferences of couples are responsive, a
couple preference P0c uniquely determines the individual preferences P
0
f and P
0
m of
the members of the couple. In what follows, we present a condition on P0C called
extreme-altruism.
Definition 3.9. A profile of couple preferences P0C is said to satisfy extreme-altruism
if for all c = { f ,m} ∈C, all h ∈ H and all h′,h′′ ∈ H ∪{λ}:
(i) h′P0f h, h
′R0f h
′′, h′′R0mλ and κh ≤ |D|−2 imply (h′,h′′)P0c (h,h), and
(ii) h′P0mh, h′R0mh′′, h′′R0f λ and κh ≤ |D|−2 imply (h′′,h′)P0c (h,h).
For illustration of extreme-altruism, consider a couple c = { f ,m} and hospitals h ∈ H
and h′,h′′ ∈ H ∪ {λ}. Suppose f strictly prefers h′ to h and weakly prefers h′ to
h′′, and m weakly prefers h′′ to λ . Then extreme-altruism says that, if h does not
have sufficiently large capacity, then c ranks (h′,h′′) above (h,h). Note here, that
if h has a sufficiently large capacity, then we would not require any restriction on
couples’ preferences, simply because the hospital h will have enough vacancies to
accommodate at least one member of the couple, thereby removing the possibility of
the couple to block with the hospital.
Out of two allocations of a couple, one where both the members are allocated at the
same hospital and the other where one member moves to a better hospital (according
to his/her individual preference), the couple prefers the latter to the former. For in-
stance, if the hospital h′ gives a substantially better salary compared to h. Then the
couple would rather prefer on member to be at h′ than both the members of the couple
to be at h.
Our next lemma shows that extreme-altruism and responsiveness together imply that
if two hospitals are acceptable for both members of a couple, then the ranking of
those two hospitals by each member of the couple is always the same. That is, if h1
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and h2 are both acceptable by each member of a couple { f ,m}, then f and m will
have same ranking over h1 and h2.
Lemma 3.6. Let P0C be a profile of couple preferences satisfying extreme-altruism.
Then, for any c = { f ,m} and any h1,h2 ∈ H such that hP0x λ for all x ∈ { f ,m} and
all h ∈ {h1,h2}, we have h1P0f h2 if and only if h1P0mh2.
Proof. Let P0C be a profile of couple preferences satisfying extreme-altruism.
Consider a couple c = { f ,m} with preference P0c and consider two hospitals
h1,h2 ∈ H. Assume for contradiction h1P0f h2P0f λ and h2P0mh1P0mλ . By re-
sponsiveness and Condition (i) of the definition of extreme-altruism, we have
(h1,λ )P0c (h2,h2)P0c (λ ,h2). Again, responsiveness and Condition (ii) of extreme-
altruism implies (λ ,h2)P0c (h1,h1)P0c (h1,λ ). However, this is a contradiction.
Our next corollary follows directly from Lemma 3.6. It says the following. Suppose
P0C satisfies the extreme-altruism. Consider a couple. Suppose that every hospital is
acceptable for each member of the couple. Then, the members of the couple have the
same individual preference over H.
Corollary 3.1. Let P0C be a profile of couple preferences satisfying extreme-altruism.
Let c= { f ,m} ∈C be a couple such that hP0f λ and hP0mλ for all h∈H. Then P0m =P0f .
For a profile of preferences P0C of the couples, an extension of P
0
C is defined as a
preference profile P = ({Pd}d∈D,{Pc}c∈C,{Ph}h∈H) such that Pc = P0c for all c ∈C.
The following theorem says that extreme-altruism of P0C is necessary and sufficient
for the existence of a stable matching for every extension of P0C .
Theorem 3.1. (i) If P0C satisfies extreme-altruism, then a stable matching exists
for any extension of P0C .
(ii) If P0C does not satisfy extreme-altruism for all h ∈ H, then there exists an exten-
sion of P0C with no stable matching.
Part (i). Consider a preference profile P that is an arbitrary extension of P0C where
P0C satisfies extreme-altruism. We show that the DPDA where each member of each
couple proposes according to his/her individual preference gives a stable matching
for P.
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Let µ be the outcome. Suppose µ is not stable at P. Since DPDA is individually
rational, Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3 imply that µ is blocked by ((h,h),c)
for some h ∈ H and some c = { f ,m} ∈ C. Let µ( f ) = h f and µ(m) = hm. Thus
(h,h)P0c (h f ,hm).
Assume without loss of generality that f Phm. By Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.5, we
know that h f P0f h. Thus, by responsiveness, we must have hP
0
mhm. Suppose κh >
|D| − 2. Then { f ,m} /∈ µ(h) implies |µ(h)| ≤ |D| − 2 < κh. But since hP0mhm, m
proposed to h at an earlier step of DPDA and got rejected even when h had a vacancy.
Thus m /∈ Dh which implies that ((h,h),c) cannot block µ . Thus κh ≤ |D|−2.
By the definition of DPDA, we have h f R0f λ and hmR
0
mλ . Also, we know that
x is weakly preferred to itself. This together with extreme-altruism implies
(h f ,λ )P0c (h,h)P0c (h f ,hm).
This contradicts the fact that hmR0mλ . Thus (h f ,hm)R0c(h f ,λ )P0c (h,h) which contra-
dicts that ((h,h),c) blocks µ . This completes the proof of part (i) of Theorem 3.1.
[Part (ii)] Suppose P0C does not satisfy extreme-altruism. We show that there exists an
extension of P0C with no stable matching.
Since P0C does not satisfy extreme-altruism, there is a couple c = { f ,m}, a hospital h
such that κh ≤ |D|−2 and hospitals h1,h2 ∈ H ∪{λ}\{h} such that:
(i) either, h1P0f h, h1R
0
f h2 and h2R
0
mλ , but (h,h)P0c (h1,h2),
(ii) or, h1P0mh, h1R
0
mh2 and h2R
0
f λ , but (h,h)P
0
c (h2,h1).
Assume without loss of generality that (i) holds.
By responsiveness, h1P0f h and (h,h)P
0
c (h1,h2), implies hP
0
mh2. Consider a preference
profile P such that
1. for all h′ ∈H \{h,h1,h2}, either |{d : dPhc and r1(Pd)= h}|= κh′ or f ,m /∈Dh′ ,
2. there are doctors d1,d2 ∈ D \ { f ,m} such that f Phd1Phd2Phm and
{ f ,m}Ph{d1,d2},
3. |{d : dPh f and r1(Pd) = h}| = κh − 2. This is possible since κh ≤ |D|− 2 im-
plies κh −2 ≤ |D|−4,
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4. either f Ph1d1Ph1m and |{d : dPh1 f and r1(Pd) = h1}|= κh1 −1, or r1(Ph1) = f ,
r2(Ph1) = d1 and m /∈ Dh1 ,
5. either |{d : dPh2c and r1(Pd) = h2}|= κh2 −1 or f /∈ Dh2 ,
6. r1(Pd1) = h1 and r2(Pd1) = r1(Pd2) = h.
But it trivially follows from this preference profile that for a stable matching µ , h′ /∈
{µ( f ),µ(m)} for h′ /∈ {h,h1,h2}. Also, it is not possible that µ(c) = (hi,hi) for
i ∈ {1,2}. Thus, by our construction, a stable matching exists for this matching
problem if and only if there is a stable matching for Example 3.1. However, since
there does not exist a stable matching for Example 3.1, thus, we do not have a stable
matching for P. This completes the proof of part (ii) of Theorem 3.1.
From the above example, it is clear that even if all hospitals view all the doctors
as acceptable, violation of extreme-altruism can lead to a preference profile with no
stable matching, if we have enough doctors to fulfil the capacity constraints as given
by points (i),(ii), (iv) and (v). Thus we get the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2. Suppose Dh = D for all h ∈ H. Moreover, ∑h∈H κh = |D|, then:
(i) If P0C satisfies extreme-altruism, then a stable matching exists for any extension
of P0C .
(ii) If P0C does not satisfy extreme-altruism for all h ∈ H, then there exists an exten-
sion of P0C with no stable matching.
3.5 Conditions on hospitals’ preferences for stability
In Section 3.4, we have discussed a necessary and sufficient condition on couples’
preferences that guarantees the existence of a stable matching for every collection of
preferences of the hospitals. In this section, we look at the other side of the problem,
that is, we look for necessary and sufficient condition on hospitals’ preferences so
that a stable matching exists for every collection of preferences of the doctors (both
individuals and couples).
Let P0H = ({P0h }h∈H) be a given profile of preferences of the hospitals. In what fol-
lows, we introduce the aversion to couple diversity property.
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Definition 3.10. A profile of hospital preferences P0H is said to have aversion to cou-
ple diversity if for all h ∈ H, all c = { f ,m} and all d1,d2 ∈ D with f ,m ∈ Dh such
that either (i) f P0h d1P
0
h d2P
0
h m and |{d : dP0h m}| > κh, or (ii) mP0h d1P0h d2P0h f and
|{d : dP0h f}|> κh, we have {d1,d2}P0h { f ,m}.
Consider a hospital h with a preference Ph over acceptable and feasible sets of doctors.
Take a couple c = { f ,m} such that both f and m are acceptable for h but at least one
of them is not amongst the top-κh doctors according to the restriction of Ph over
individual doctors. Suppose that there are two doctors d1,d2 who are ranked in-
between f and m according to Ph. Then, aversion to couple diversity says that the
set {d1,d2} must be preferred to the couple c according to Ph. Note here that if both
the members of the couple are in the top-κh doctors according to the restriction of Ph
over individual doctors, then we do not need this condition as for a stable matching,
the couple will always be a part of h.
So, in other words, whenever a hospital compares a couple and another pair of doctors
over which responsiveness does not induce the comparison, the hospital prefers the
couple only if at most one doctor from the other pair ranks in-between the members
of the couple. Thus, a hospital has aversion to couple diversity if it does not like
to employ a couple whose members have relatively more dissimilar ranking in its
preference.
It is important to note here that the diversity aversion just applies to couples and not
single doctors as two single doctors can not apply to a hospital together and block a
matching. On the other hand, we can encounter a situation where a couple applies to
a hospital such that a member of a couple is individually worse off but the couple is
better off as a whole.
For a profile of preferences P0H of the hospitals, an extension of P
0
H is defined as a
preference profile P = ({Pd}d∈D,{Pc}c∈C,{Ph}h∈H) such that Ph = P0h for all h ∈ H.
Our next theorem says that the aversion to couple diversity of P0H is necessary and
sufficient for the existence of a stable matching for every extension of P0H .
Theorem 3.2. (i) If P0H satisfies aversion to couple diversity property, then a sta-
ble matching exists at every extension of P0H .
(ii) If P0H does not satisfy aversion to couple diversity property, then there exists an
extension of P0H with no stable matching.
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Part (i). Consider a preference profile P that is an arbitrary extension of P0H where
P0H satisfies aversion to couple diversity. We show that the DPDA where each mem-
ber of each couple proposes according to his/her individual preference gives a stable
matching for P.
Let µ be the outcome. Suppose µ is not stable at P. Since DPDA is individually
rational, Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3 imply that µ is blocked by ((h,h),c)
for some h ∈ H and some c = { f ,m} ∈ C. Let µ( f ) = h f and µ(m) = hm. Thus
(h,h)P0c (h f ,hm).
Assume without loss of generality that f Phm. If m /∈ Dh, then ((h,h),c) cannot block
µ as it violates individual rationality. Thus mP0h λ . By Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.5,
we know that h f P0f h. Thus, responsiveness implies hPmhm.
It follows that, before applying to hm, m applied to h and got rejected. Therefore,
|{d : dP0h m and d ∈ µ(h)}|= κh. Since f P0h m and f /∈ µ(h), we have |{d : dP0h f}|>
κh. This, together with aversion to couple diversity, implies that {d,d′}P0h { f ,m} for
all d,d′ ∈ µ(h), which is a contradiction to the fact that ((h,h),c) blocks µ . This
completes the proof of part (i) of Theorem 3.2.
[Part (ii)] Suppose P0H does not satisfy the aversion to couple diversity property. We
show that there is an extension of P0H with no stable matching.
Since P0H does not satisfy the aversion to couple diversity property, we have h ∈ H,
c = { f ,m} ∈C and d1,d2 ∈ D with f ,m ∈ Dh such that { f ,m}P0h {d1,d2} and either
(i) f P0h d1P
0
h d2P
0
h m and |{d : dP0h m}|> κh, or
(ii) mP0h d1P
0
h d2P
0
h f and |{d : dP0h f}|> κh.
Assume without loss of generality that (i) holds. Consider a preference profile P such
that
(i) λPf h,
(ii) hPmλ ,
(iii) (h,h)Pc(λ ,λ ),
(iv) for all h′ ∈ H \{h} either hPf h′, or |{d : dP0h′ f and r1(Pd) = h′}|= κh′ ,
(v) for all h′ ∈ H \{h} either λPmh′, or |{d : dP0h′m and r1(Pd) = h′}|= κh′ ,
(vi) r1(Pd1) = r1(Pd2) = h, and
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(vii) |{d : dP0h m and r1(Pd) = h}|= κh. Note, that this also includes d1 and d2.
But it trivially follows from the given preference profile that for a stable matching µ ,
for all h′ ∈ H \{h}, h′ /∈ {µ( f ),µ(m)}. Thus, by our construction, a stable matching
exists for this matching problem if and only if there is a stable matching for Example
3.2. However, since there does not exist a stable matching for Example 3.2, thus we
do not have a stable matching for P. This completes the proof of part (ii) of Theorem
3.2.
From the example above, it is not clear if non-aversion to couple diversity can always
lead to a preference profile with no stable matching when doctors prefer to be matched
any hospital than being unemployed. We show by the means of an example that if all
the doctors are averse to unemployment, then we can not always obtain an extension
of P0H with no stable matching, when P
0
H does not satisfy aversion to couple diversity.
Example 3.3. Consider a matching problem with H = {h1,h2} and D= { f ,m,s1,s2}
such that c = { f ,m} is the only couple. Let κh1 = κh2 = 2. Thus, ∑h∈H κh = |D|. The
preferences of hospitals on individual doctors is given in the table below. The doctors
prefer to be matched to any hospital than being unemployed.
Ph1 Ph2
f s2
s1 m
s2 f
m s1
Table 3.3: Stability with Unemployment Aversion
Let { f ,m}Ph1{s1,s2}. Thus the preference h1 does not follow aversion to couple
diversity.
We show that there exists a stable matching for these preferences of hospitals for any
preferences of the doctors and the couple.
Let µ be a matching for the given preferences of the hospitals such that µ(h1) =
{ f ,s1} and µ(h2) = {s2,m}. Clearly, h1 and h2 have their top ranked doctors. Thus,
neither h1 nor h2 would like to block µ with any other doctor. Also, no doctor would
block µ with λ as all doctors prefer being matched to any hospital than be unem-
ployed. Thus µ is stable for any preferences of doctors even when there is no aversion
for diverse couples.
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The above example leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3. Suppose hPdλ for all h ∈ H and all d ∈ D, then a stable matching
always exists for any extension of P0H when P
0
H satisfies aversion to diverse couples.
3.6 Concluding remarks
As we have discussed earlier, existence of a stable matching is guaranteed at a pref-
erence profile if it satisfies responsiveness as defined in Klaus and Klijn (2005). The
different result in this chapter stems from the fact that we allow for a setwise blocking
notion, which allows for the existence of more blocking coalitions. Here, a hospital is
allowed to replace two doctors by a couple, whilst Klaus and Klijn consider pairwise
blocking. Thus, if a couple wishes to block with a hospital, both the members of the
couple will be considered separately by the hospital instead of considering the couple
as a whole. We explain this in detail in the following paragraph.
Consider Example 3.1 and Example 3.2. According to the model in Klaus and Klijn
(2005), given the preference P¯h1 , the pair { f ,m} can not block with h1 to remove the
pair of doctors {d1,d2}. By their blocking notion, each member of the couple can
only replace a doctor who is ranked lower to that member of the couple. The fact that
d1 and d2 are ranked in-between f and m, prevent the couple to block with h1.
Now, consider the matching µ1 for Example 3.1 and µ2 for Example 3.2 such that
µ1(c) = (h2,h3), µ1(d1) = µ1(d2) = h1 and µ2(c) = (λ ,λ ), µ2(d1) = µ2(d2) = h1.
Note that, in our model, both these matchings are blocked by ((h1,h1),c). However,
this block is not possible according to the model in Klaus and Klijn (2005). It can be
verified that µ1 and µ2 are indeed stable according to their model.
In this chapter, we have shown that the existence of a stable matching is not guaran-
teed when couples and/or hospitals have complete and responsive preferences. We
have provided (a) necessary and sufficient conditions on couples’ preferences so that
a stable matching exists at every extension of those preferences, and (b) necessary
and sufficient conditions on hospitals’ preferences so that a stable matching exists at
every extension of those preferences. Additionally, we have provided algorithms that
produce a stable matching whenever that exists in this framework.
Part II
Social Choice Theory
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CHAPTER 4
Collective Choice Rules on Convex Restricted Domains
4.1 Introduction
One attempt to avoid the well-known impossibility theorems of Arrow and Gibbard-
Satterthwaite on collective decision making is dropping the unrestricted domain con-
dition. It means that the individuals taking part in this collective decision potentially
may have any preference of a certain kind, e.g. linear orderings or weak orderings
over the collective alternatives on which has to be decided. Relaxing this condition
leads to so-called restricted domains. Here agents potentially may only have prefer-
ences from pre-specified subsets of the set of linear orders or it leads to domains for
collective decision making in which all preferences are potentially possible but cer-
tain combinations of these are only allowed. However, restricting the domain might
still lead to impossibility results, thus demonstrating that the equivalence between
non-manipulability and dictatorship is far more robust than suggested by the above
mentioned impossibility theorems. (See e.g. Aswal e.a.[2003] and Sato[2010]). Here
like in e.g. Kalai e.a.[1977] and Kalai e.a.[1980] and Ritz[1985] we investigate do-
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mains allowing ‘reasonable’ collective decision rules, where at these domains the
individual preferences may be chosen independently. Hence, every individual is char-
acterised by a set of admissible preferences being a subset of all possible preferences.
Moreover, we assume that any preference which is an intermediate of two admissible
preferences is admissible as well.
There are many studies on domain restrictions (See for a general overview e.g. Gaert-
ner [2002]). Examples on restrictions of combinations of individual preferences can
for instance be found in the well-known literature on characterising domains which
allow for consistent pairwise majority decisions. (See e.g. Sen e.a.[1969] and In-
ada [1964]). A well-known example on restrictions which allow for independent
individual preferences is that of single peaked preferences.(See e.g. Arrow[1978],
Black[1948] and Moulin[1980] being just an arbitrary choice of this strand of litera-
ture). Another example of such restrictions is that of single dipped preferences. (See
e.g. Barberà e.a. [2012] where they characterise the set of all individual and group
strategy-proof rules on this domain).
Having two preferences by repeatedly swapping consecutive ordered pairs of alter-
natives the one preference can be obtained from the other. The domain restriction
imposed in this chapter demands that all the intermediate results in this swapping
process are admissible if of course the starting two preferences are admissible. In this
way we guarantee a natural assumption that the set of admissible preferences of an
individual allows for any "continuous" change of these preferences. For instance let
at one admissible preference alternative a be strictly preferred to b and b strictly to
c (assuming transitivity we also have that a is strictly preferred to c) and at an other
preference let c be strictly preferred to a and a strictly to b. So, in both preferences
a is strictly preferred to b, where in the one c is worst among these three and in the
other c is best. As both these preferences are admissible it is natural to assume that
also the intermediate of these two where c is ordered between a and b is admissible.
Precisely this is captured by the requirement that the intermediate of two admissible
preferences is admissible.
Consider the Kemeny distance between preferences. For any two preferences it
counts the pairs that are differently ordered in these two preferences (see also Ke-
meny e.a. [1962]). It is easy to see that a preference is intermediate of two given
preferences if the Kemeny distance between these two equals the sum of the Kemeny
distances from each of these to the intermediate. That is, the triangle inequality holds
with equality. Geometrically speaking this intermediate is on the segment between the
other two. Hence, the condition on the intermediate is just a convexity requirement
with respect to the Kemeny distance. That is we demand that the set of admissible
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preferences is a convex subset of the set of all preferences. Clearly such a convex
set may range from the set of all preferences, the least restrictive situation as there
is no restriction imposed, to a singleton set the most restrictive case. It appears that
a convex subset of the set of linear orderings, i.e. the set of all complete, antisym-
metric and transitive relations, can be characterised as follows. For every convex set
there is a partial ordering, i.e. reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation, which
is contained in all preferences belonging to this set and moreover any linear ordering
containing this partial ordering belongs to this convex set. So, a subset of the set
of linear orderings is convex if, and only if, there is a partial ordering such that this
convex set equals the set of all linear orderings that contain this partial ordering.
Next consider the case of restricted domains where the sets of individually admissible
preferences are convex subsets of the set of linear orderings. The set of admissible
preferences of a specific individual is characterised by a partial ordering that is con-
tained in all its admissible preferences. Therefore this partial ordering can be seen as
a part of the preference of that individual which is known in advance. It is called a
priori information. Hence, the restricted domain at hand is completely determined by
these individual partial orderings. A natural question is which combination of indi-
vidual partial orderings determines a restricted domain allowing for non-dictatorial,
unanimous and strategy-proof choice rules. We will answer this question with respect
to the union of all these partial orderings: the united a priori information. In Stor-
cken[1985] a similar question is studied with respect to Arrow-like welfare functions.
These are Pareto-optimal, non-dictatorial welfare functions which are independent of
irrelevant alternatives. Roughly speaking such a restricted domain admits Arrow-like
welfare functions if not all free triples with respect to the united a priori information
are connected. Here a free triple with respect to this a priori information is a triple of
alternatives which has no ordered pair of different alternatives in common with this
united a priori information. This means that all agents may order these three alterna-
tives in all six possible ways. In this chapter the characterisation looks at least more
restrictive. Loosely speaking these domains allow for unanimous, non-dictatorial and
strategy-proof choice rules if there are (at most) two undominated alternatives with
respect to the united a priori information. Moreover, the choice rule now is just a
monotonic choice rule between these two alternatives.
This difference in conditions on the united a priori information between the welfare
function case and the choice function case stems primarily from the non-dictatorship
requirement. Contrary to a choice function at a welfare function an individual might
not be a dictator even if his best alternative is always ordered best in the social rank-
ing as long as somewhere the rest of his preferences is not always copied as the social
ranking. Moreover, as the domain in this setting is possibly restricted, not all al-
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ternatives might be ranked best by this individual. Lemma 4.3 however shows that
this domain does not allow for unanimous, non-dictatorial and strategy-proof choice
rules. This shows that although the earlier paper of Storcken[1985] and the present
work are based on strongly related ideas, they seem logically independent.
Indeed Lemma 4.1 and 4.2 show that in case there are at least three undominated al-
ternatives with respect to the united a priori information then only dictatorial choice
rules are unanimous and strategy-proof. Having this result it is straight forward
to see that essentially the case of two undominated alternatives with respect to the
united a priori information may yield the possibility of non-dictatorial, unanimous
and strategy-proof choice rules. Rules that are unanimous and monotonic choices
between two alternatives. The cases of one and no undominated alternatives are re-
duced to the two undominated alternatives case. This however may fail as the example
above on one undominated alternative a demonstrates. Lemma’s 4.3 and 4.4 are on
necessary and sufficient conditions in order to transform these cases to the case of
two undominated alternatives.
There have been many studies on domain restrictions which have tried to charac-
terise the preference domains on which some specific non-dictatorial choice rule is
strategy-proof. (See e.g. Barbie e.a.[2006] for Borda count, and Sanver[2009] for
plurality rule). There have also been studies which have tried to find out necessary
conditions for strategy-proofness and then have tried to find the domain restrictions
to satisfy those conditions. (See e.g. Barberà e.a. [2012]). This chapter differs from
these papers, as the domain restriction does not depend on a specific choice rule or
certain set of conditions. We already have a restricted domain, where the nature of
choice rule depends on the united a priori information of the individuals. However,
the biggest difference between this chapter and other works on restricted domains,
stems from the fact that different individuals can have different preference domains
based on the different a priori information. This can be justified, as different indi-
viduals may have different domain of preferences for the same set of alternatives.
For example, an individual of a particular religion might be averse to certain kind of
meat and would always prefer any other food item over it. This leads to a priori in-
formation where the alternative of meat is always dominated by any other alternative
of food item. However, this a priori information might be completely different the
from priori information of another individual having some other dietary preference
or restriction. Similarly, political issues can be ordered in a differently for different
individuals based on their beliefs on religion, abortion, freedom of speech etc. This
in turn would lead to completely different convex preference domains for the indi-
viduals. Thus, the fact that different individuals can have different convex restricted
domain makes our result applicable to a wide range of examples.
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This chapter is organised as follows. Besides some basic concepts on preferences
section 4.2 is on the character of convex subsets of the set of linear orderings. In
section 4.3 the decision model on convex restricted domains is introduced. Section
4.4 discusses sufficient and necessary conditions such that these domains admit non-
dictatorial, unanimous and strategy-proof choice rules. In section 4.5, we consider
the application to a model where alternatives belong on a Euclidean plane. Section
4.6 concludes.
4.2 Convex sets of preferences
Let A denote a non-empty and finite set of alternatives and R a relation on A. For
a non-empty subset B of A the restriction of R to B is denoted by R|B. The best
alternatives with respect to R are defined by best(R) = {x ∈ A|(x,y)∈ R for all y ∈ A}.
The undominated alternatives with respect to R are defined by undom(R) = {x ∈
A|(y,x) /∈ R for all y ∈ A−{x}}. Let L(A) denote the set of all linear orderings on A,
i.e. all reflexive, transitive, complete and anti-symmetric relations on A. Cardinality
of a set S is denoted by #S.
Let R1, R2 and R3 be three linear orderings on A. Let B be a non-trivial subset of A.
The relation R1|B  R2|A−B = R1|B ∪R2|A−B ∪ (B× (A−B)) is a relation in which
the alternatives in B are ordered as in R1, the alternatives in A−B are ordered as
in R2, and in which all alternatives in B are strictly preferred to all alternatives in
A−B. As a convention we write R1|x instead of R1|{x} for alternatives x. Further,
instead of (x,y) ∈ R1 and (y,x) /∈ R1 we also write R1 = ...x  ...y.... The notation
R1 = ...x  y... means that (x,y) ∈ R1 and (y,x) /∈ R1 and in addition there are no
alternatives z which are ordered in between x and y. The Kemeny distance1 between
R1 and R2 is defined by
δ (R1,R2) :=
1
2
#[(R1 −R2)∪ (R2 −R1)].
This distance equals the number of switches needed to change relation R1 into R2. We
will call a single setup an elementary change, i.e. R1 and R2 form such an elementary
change if there are two different alternatives a and b such that R1 = (R2 ∪{(a,b)})−
{(b,a)}. Linear ordering R3 is said to be between R1 and R2 if it is on a shortest path
1We take here half the Kemeny distance because between complete anti-symmetric relations this dis-
tance is an even number.
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from R1 to R3, i.e. δ (R1,R2) = δ (R1,R3)+δ (R3,R2). In that case R3 can be seen as
an intermediate in the change of R1 into R2 by reversing pairs of alternatives. Clearly
this equality holds if, and only if, (R1∩R2)⊆R3 ⊆ (R1∪R2). A set of linear orderings
say V is said to be convex if for all R1, R2 in V and all R3 in L(A) if R3 is between R1
and R2 , then R3 is in V . The following proposition characterises convexity of sets of
preferences.
Proposition 4.1. Let V be a set of linear orderings. Then V is a convex set if, and only
if, there is a partial ordering say P on A, i.e. transitive, reflexive and anti-symmetric,
such that
V = {R ∈ L(A)|P ⊆ R}.
Proof. (if-part) Let V = {R ∈ L(A)|P ⊆ R}. Furthermore let R1, R2 ∈ V , R3 in L(A)
such that R3 is between R1 and R2. It is sufficient to prove that R3 is in V . Because R3
is between R1 and R2 we have (R1 ∩R2)⊆ R3. As R1, R2 ∈ V = {R ∈ L(A)|P ⊆ R} it
follows that P ⊆ (R1∩R2). So, P ⊆ (R1∩R2)⊆ R3. So, R3 ∈ {R ∈L(A)|P ⊆ R}=V .
(only-if-part) Let V be a convex set of linear orderings. Define P = ∩{R|R ∈ V}.
As all relations in V are reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric P has these three
properties. Now by definition of P it follows that V ⊆ {R ∈ L(A)|P ⊆ R}. We have
to prove that {R ∈ L(A)|P ⊆ R} ⊆ V . To the contrary suppose this is not the case.
Then we may find an elementary change, say R1 and R2 such that R1 ∈ V and R2 ∈
{R ∈ L(A)|P ⊆ R}−V . So, there are two different alternatives say a and b such that
R1 = (R2 ∪{(a,b)})−{(b,a)}. As V ⊆ {R ∈ L(A)|P ⊆ R} it follows that both R1
and R2 are in {R ∈ L(A)|P ⊆ R}. Hence, neither (a,b) nor (b,a) is in P. Now by
the definition of P and by the convexity of V we may assume the existence of two
preferences say R3 and R4 in V such that R3 = (R4 ∪{(a,b)})−{(b,a)}, that is these
two preferences form an elementary change in this same pair a and b. Now (R1 ∩
R4)⊆ R1 −{(a,b),(b,a)} ⊆ R2 ⊆ R1 ∪{(a,b),(b,a)} ⊆ (R1 ∪R4), which means that
R2 is between R1 and R4. But then by the convexity of V we derive the contradiction
R2 ∈V .
4.3 Convex restricted domains
Consider collective choice rules involving finite sets of alternatives A and agents
N = {1,2, ...n} both containing at least two elements. To an agent i we associate Vi
a convex subset of the set of linear orderings L(A). This set Vi represents the set of
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admissible preferences of this agent. By Proposition 4.1 there is a partial ordering
Pi such that Vi = L(Pi,A) = {R ∈ L(A)|Pi ⊆ R}. So, this partial ordering Pimay
be considered as the a priori information we have about agent i’s preference. Let
VN denote the set of all profiles p of individual admissible preferences. The profile p
assigns to every agent i a preference p(i) in Vi. A (collective) choice rule is a function
f from VN to A. It assigns to every profile of individual admissible preferences p, a
collective choice f (p).
Hereafter choice rules f are studied with respect to the following five conditions:
Unanimity: f (p) = a for all profiles p and alternatives a such that best(p(i)) = {a}
for all agents i,
Strategy-proofness: ( f (p), f (q)) ∈ p( j) for all agents j and all j-deviations p and q,
i.e. p,q ∈ VN with p|N−{ j} = q|N−{ j},
Maskin Monotonicity: for all profiles p and q such that ( f (p),x) ∈ p(i) implies
( f (p),x) ∈ q(i) for all agents i and all alternatives x we have that f (q) = f (p),
Strong Positive Association: for profiles p and q and alternatives a if for all agents i
in N, p(i)|A−{a} = q(i)|A−{a} and (a,b) ∈ p(i) implies (a,b) ∈ q(i) for all alternatives
b ∈ A, then f (q) ∈ {a, f (p)}.
Non-image-dictatorship: for all agents j there are profiles p such that f (p) 6=
best(p( j)| f (VN)), where f (VN) = { f (p)|p ∈ VN} is the range of f .
Strategy-proofness, Maskin monotonicity, unanimity and strong positive association
are standard in literature. We will not comment on these further. Usually when we
talk of non-dictatorship, it is defined as follows
for all agents j there are profiles p such that f (p) 6= best(p( j)).
Omitting the restriction to the image of f would yield that many convex restricted
domains VN admit odd unanimous, strategy-proof and non-dictatorial choice rules.
For instance if there are agents i and j and alternatives a and b such that (a,b) ∈ Pi
and b ∈ undom(P j). In that case define f for an arbitrary profile as follows
f (p) = best(p( j)|A−{b}).
This choice rule is strategy-proof, unanimous and image-dictatorial with image-
dictator j, but it is non-dictatorial as b is not chosen if it is j’s best alternative.
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Strategy-proofness follows by the dictatorial nature of this rule. Note that unanim-
ity does not apply to b. So, obviously the choice rule is unanimous. Clearly non-
image-dictatorship is a stronger condition than non-dictatorship, because f (p) =
best(p( j)) implies best(p( j)) ∈ f (VN) and therefore f (p) = best(p( j)) implies
f (p) = best(p( j)| f (VN)). To avoid odd possibilities like discussed above we strength-
ened non-dictatorship to non-image-dictatorship.
Remark 4.1. Because of the convexity of the domain of individual preferences and
the anti-symmetry condition on these individual preferences it follows that strategy-
proofness, Maskin monotonicity and strong positive association are all three equiva-
lent to each other. See also Bochet ea.[2005].
Remark 4.2. Note that for strategy-proof choice rules f from VN to A and profiles p
and q such that p| f (VN) = q| f (VN) we have that f (p) = f (q).
4.4 Possibilities under Unanimity
In this section we investigate convex restricted domains VN which allow for strategy-
proof, unanimous and non-image-dictatorial choice rules. Therefore, call VN a pos-
sibility domain if there exists a unanimous, strategy-proof and non-image-dictatorial
choice rule f from VN to A. Let P∗ = ∪{Pi ∈ Vi|i ∈ N} the union of all a priori
information. Related to P∗ we will formulate necessary and sufficient conditions for
convex restricted domains such that these are possibility domains.
The following example deals with a possibility domain that essentially is a represen-
tation of the format of any possibility domain in case there are precisely two undom-
inated alternatives.
Example 4.1. Let undom(P∗) = {a,b}, where a 6= b. Now any non-image-dictatorial
monotonic choice rule on these two alternatives yields a unanimous, strategy-proof
and non-image-dictatorial choice rule on VN . To be more explicit let Wa and Wb be
two sets of subsets of N such that for x ∈ {a,b} and for S ⊆ T ⊆ N
1. none of the sets in Wx is a singleton,
2. N ∈Wx,
3. if S ∈Wx and S ⊆ T ⊆ N, then T ∈Wx,
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4. S ∈Wa if, and only if, (N −S) /∈Wb.
Define choice rule f from VN to A for a profile p as follows
f (p) = a if {i ∈ N|(a,b) ∈ p(i)} ∈Wa
= b if {i ∈ N|(b,a) ∈ p(i)} ∈Wb.
Now f is well-defined because of condition (4). Strategy-proofness follows because
of the monotonicity condition (3) and non-image-dictatorship because of condition
(1). As a and b are the only undominated elements of P∗ unanimity has no bite on the
other alternatives. Unanimity on a and b now follows from condition (2).
Example 4.1 shows that if the united a priori information P∗ has two undominated
elements, then the domain allows for strategy-proof, non-image-dictatorial and unan-
imous choice rules. Let U = undom(P∗). It appears that the cardinality #U of U plays
an important role in whether or not a domain at hand allows for non-image-dictatorial,
unanimous and strategy-proof choice rules. For agents i let P˜i = Pi ∪ (U × (A−U))
and V˜i = L(P˜i,A). Because Pi ⊆ P˜i, it follows that V˜i ⊆Vi for all agents i. Note that
at profiles in V˜N all agents prefer all alternatives in U to all alternatives which are not
in U . As the alternatives in U are undominated elements of the union of all a priori
information P∗ it follows that no agent a priori prefers any among these. So, if we
would restrict all linear orderings in V˜i to U then we would obtain the set of all linear
orderings on U : V˜i|U = L(U).
For the four cases #U ≥ 3, #U = 2, #U = 1 and #U = 0 we will investigate the possi-
bilities of non-image-dictatorial, unanimous and strategy-proof choice rules from VN
to A. Let h be a unanimous and strategy-proof choice rule from VN to A. For the case
#U ≥ 3 the following two lemmas yield that h is image-dictatorial.
Lemma 4.1. Let #U > 3. Then there is an agent, say j, such that for all profiles p in
VN and all alternatives x ∈U if best(p( j)) = x, then h(p) = x.
Proof. Let h˜ = h|V˜N . As h˜ inherits unanimity and strategy-proofness from h, it fol-
lows that h˜ is Maskin monotone and unanimous. From this we may easily deduce
that h˜( V˜N) = U . Moreover, note that by Maskin monotonicity it now follows that
for profiles p and q in V˜N h˜(p) = h˜(q) if p|U = q|U . So, h˜ can be seen as a choice
rule on V˜N |U = L(U)N . Gibbard-Satterthwaite [1973,1975] yields that h˜ is dicta-
torial, with dictator say j. Now let p be a profile in VN with best(p( j)) = x ∈ U .
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It is sufficient to prove h(p) = x. Take y ∈ U − {x} and profiles q and r in VN
such that q( j) = x  y  p( j)|A−{x,y}, r( j) = x  y  p( j)|U−{x,y}  p( j)|A−U ,
q(i) = y  p(i)|A−{y} and r(i) = y  p(i)|U−{y}  p(i)|A−U for agents i different
from j. As r ∈ V˜N and h˜ is dictatorial with dictator j it follows that h(r) = x. Strategy-
proofness and unanimity imply that h(q) /∈ A−{x,y}. So, h(q) ∈ {x,y}. As h(r) = x
Maskin monotonicity implies that h(q) 6= y. So, h(q) = x. By Maskin monotonicity
this implies h(p) = x.
Lemma 4.1 shows that if there are enough undominated elements with respect to the
union of a priori information, then there is an agent which is image-dictatorial on
all these undominated elements. The lemma hereafter shows that this decisiveness
spreads on all alternatives in the image of choice rule h.
Lemma 4.2. Let #U > 3. Then there is an agent, say j, such that for all profiles p in
VN and all alternatives x ∈ h(VN) if best(p( j)|h(VN)) = x, then h(p) = x. Hence, h is
image-dictatorial with image-dictator j.
Proof. Let j be as in Lemma 4.1. Let x ∈ h(VN) and best(p( j)|h(VN)) = x. As x ∈
h(VN) there is a profile w ∈ VN with h(w) = x. We will construct a list of profiles
starting with w and ending at p and prove for all these profiles that their image is
x under h. Consider profile v a j-deviation of w such that v( j) = p( j) and v(i) =
w(i) for i 6= j. Because of strategy-proofness and best(p( j)|h(VN)) = x it follows
from h(w) = x that h(v) = x. Now let a and b be two different alternatives in U .
Without loss of generality assume that (b,a)∈ p( j). Consider profile u defined for all
agents i different from j by u(i) = b  v(i)|A−{b}. Let u( j) be obtained from v( j) by
shifting a just below x and b just below a: u( j) = ...x  a  b.... So, u( j)|A−{a,b} =
v( j)|A−{a,b} and u( j) ranks x just above a just above b. Let u˜ be the j-deviation
of v such that u˜( j) = u( j). Because of h(v) = x, Maskin monotonicity implies that
h(u˜) = x. But then h(u) 6= a, because otherwise Maskin monotonicity would imply
that h(u˜) = a if h(u) = a. To see that h(u) 6= b consider profile û a j-deviation of u
such that û( j) = a  u( j)|A−{a}. By Lemma 4.1 we have that h(û) = a. Now h(u) 6=
b, because otherwise Maskin monotonicity would imply that h(û) = b if h(u) = b.
Finally unanimity and strategy-proofness imply that h(u) /∈ h(VN)−{a,b,x}. So,
h(u) = x. Let profile r be the j-deviation of u such that r( j)|A−{b} = p( j)|A−{b} and
r( j)|A−{a} = u( j)|A−{a}. That is r( j) is obtained from p( j) by shifting b just below x.
Maskin monotonicity implies that h(r) = x. Let q be the profile such that q( j) = r( j)
and for all agents i different from j let q(i) = b  p(i)|A−{b}. Maskin monotonicity
and h(r) = x implies h(q) 6= b. Strategy-proofness and unanimity imply that h(q) /∈
h(VN)−{b,x}. So, h(q) = x and Maskin monotonicity now implies h(p) = x.
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For the case #U = 2 Example 4.1 shows that there are non-image-dictororial, unan-
imous and strategy-proof choice rules. Example 4.2 below shows a case in which
such choice rules exist in case #U = 1. Moreover, the sufficiency condition implicitly
spelled out by this example appears to be necessary as is shown in Lemma 4.3 below.
Example 4.2. Let U = {a} and let b ∈ A−{a} such that (a,b) /∈ P1 ∪P2. Define
choice rule f from VN to A for a profile p as follows
f (p) = b if both (b,a) ∈ p(1) and (b,a) ∈ p(2)
= a in all other cases.
Clearly f is non-image-dictatorial and because U = {a} unanimity has no bite on
alternatives different from a. Hence, by definition it follows that f is unanimous.
Strategy-proofness follows because f is essentially a monotonic choice rule between
two alternatives.
Actually in Example 4.2, we defined a choice rule on two alternatives and two agents
where neither the rest of the agents nor the rest of the alternatives can influence the
outcome. These act just like dummies. It is clear however that we may define choice
rules at which more agents, say j, can have an impact on the outcome if for such
agents (a,b) /∈ P j. It is also clear that if there is only one agent say agent 1 for which
(a,b) /∈ P1 the choice rule defined in Example 4.2 is image-dictatorial. The following
Lemma 4.3 shows that if U = {a} for some alternative a, then the existence of an
alternative b 6= a such that for two agents i and j (a,b) /∈Pi∪P j is not only a sufficient
but also a necessary condition such that h is non-image-dictatorial.
Lemma 4.3. Let U = {a} for some alternative a in A. Then the following two are
equivalent
1. There are different agents i and j and an alternative b ∈ A−{a} such that
(a,b) /∈ Pi ∪P j;
2. There exist unanimous, strategy-proof and non-image-dictatorial choice rules
f from VN to A.
Proof. ((1) implies (2)) This implication follows by Example 4.2.
((2) implies (1)) To prove the contra position of this implication suppose
(α) For all alternatives b ∈ A−{a} there are agents ib such that (a,b) ∈ P j for all
j ∈ N −{ib};
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(β ) Choice rules f from VN to A is unanimous and strategy-proof.
It is sufficient to prove that f is image-dictatorial. By unanimity and U = {a} it
follows that a ∈ f (VN). If f (VN) = {a}, then f is constant and every agent is image-
dictator of f . Let {a,b} = f (VN) for some b ∈ A−{a}. In view of Remark 4.2,
assumption (α) and unanimity of f yield that for a profile r
f (r) = b if (b,a) ∈ p(ib)
= a in all other cases.
So, agent ib is image-dictator of f . Finally, consider the case that f (VN) has at least
three elements. Let b,c ∈ f (VN) and a, b and c be all different. We first prove that
ib = ic. Then we show that this agent is image-dictator. To the contrary assume that
ib 6= ic. In view of assumption (α) and Maskin monotonicity for all x ∈ f (VN)−{a}
there are profiles px such that f (px) = x, for all j ∈ N −{ix} best(px( j)) = a and
px(ix) = ...x  a.... Consider profile q defined by q(ib) = pb(ib), q(ic) = pc(ic) and
best(q( j))= a for all j ∈N−{ib, ic}. By assumption (α) it follows that (a,b)∈ pc(ic)
and (a,c) ∈ pb(ib). Because f (pb) = b, Maskin monotonicity implies f (q) 6= a.
Let r be a profile defined by q|N−{ib,ic} = r|N−{ib,ic}, r(ib) = a  pb(ib)|A−{a} and
r(ic) = a  pc(ic)|A−{a}. By unanimity f (r) = a, so Maskin monotonicity im-
plies ( f (q),a) ∈ q(ib) or ( f (q),a) ∈ q(ic). Because of f (q) 6= a, assumption (α)
implies either (a, f (q)) ∈ q(ib) or (a, f (q)) ∈ q(ic). Without loss of generality as-
sume ( f (q),a) ∈ q(ib) and therewith consequently (a, f (q)) ∈ q(ic). Consider profile
v defined by v|N−{ib} = q|N−{ib} and v(ib) = a  pb(ib)|A−{a}. Comparing q and
v, Strong Positive Association yields that f (v) ∈ {a, f (q)}. If f (v) = f (q), then f
is manipulable by agent ic at profile v towards profile r. If f (v) = a, then Maskin
monotonicity implies the contradiction f (pc) = a. Hence, ib = ic. Since b and c
were arbitrary choices, we may conclude that there is an agent i such that i = ix for
all x ∈ f (VN)−{a}. In order to prove that i is image-dictator of f let w be a pro-
file in VN such that x = best(w(i)| f (VN)). It is sufficient to prove that f (w) = x.
To the contrary let f (w) = y 6= x. By assumption (α) we have that (a,z) ∈ w( j)
for all z ∈ f (VN)−{a} and all j ∈ N −{i}. According to Remark 4.2 we may as-
sume that a = best(w( j)) for all j ∈ N −{i}. Because f (w) = y it follows by una-
nimity and strategy-proofness that (y,a) ∈ w(i). Consider i-deviation u of w such
that u( j) = w( j) for j ∈ N − {i}, u(i) = ...x  a... and u(i)|A−{a} = w(i)|A−{a}.
Strong Positive Association and the assumption x = best(w(i)| f (VN)) and therewith
x= best(u(i)| f (VN)) imply that f (u)∈{a,y}. As (a,y)∈ u(i), unanimity and strategy-
proofness imply that f (u) 6= y in case a 6= y. So, f (u) = a. But then Maskin mono-
tonicity implies f (px) = a, where px(i) = u(i) and px|N−{i} = px|N−{i}. Because
f (px) = x and (x,a) ∈ px(i), where x 6= a, it follows that f is manipulable at px by
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agent i towards profile px. This contradiction yields that f (w) = x and f is image-
dictatorial with image-dictator i.
Finally, we consider the case where U = /0. First we introduce an example which
expresses a sufficient condition. Then like in the case that U is a singleton, we show
that this sufficient condition is also necessary.
Example 4.3. Let U = /0. Let a,b ∈ A, with a 6= b, such that (a,b) /∈ P1 ∪P2 and
(b,a) /∈ P1 ∪P2. Define choice rule f for a profile p as follows
f (p) = b if both (b,a) ∈ p(1) and (b,a) ∈ p(2)
= a in all other cases.
Like in Example 4.2 it follows that f is unanimous, strategy-proof and non-image-
dictatorial.
Lemma 4.4. Let U = /0. Then the following two are equivalent
1. There are different agents i and j and alternatives a,b ∈ A such that (a,b) /∈
Pi ∪P j and (b,a) /∈ Pi ∪P j;
2. There exist unanimous, strategy-proof and non-image-dictatorial choice rules
f from VN to A.
Proof. ((1) implies (2)) This implication follows by Example 4.3.
((2) implies (1)) To prove the contra position of this implication suppose
(α) For all alternatives a,b ∈ A, with a 6= b there are agents iab such that for all
j ∈ N −{iab}, (a,b) ∈ P j or (b,a) ∈ P j;
(β ) Choice rules f from VN to A is unanimous and strategy-proof.
It is sufficient to prove that f is image-dictatorial. If f (VN) is a singleton, then f is a
constant choice rule and all agents are image-dictator. So, let f (VN) consist of more
than one element. Because VN is a convex restricted domain we may assume that
there is an agent i, alternatives a and b, with a 6= b, and profiles pa and pb such that
f (pa) = a, f (pb) = b, pa|N−{i} = pb|N−{i} and pa(i) = (pb(i)−{(b,a)})∪{(a,b)}.
From assumption (α) we infer that i = iab. Next let Xa = {p ∈ VN | p(i) = pa(i)}
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and let Xb = {p ∈ VN | p(i) = pb(i)}. We show that f (Xa) = {a} and f (Xb) = {b}.
Let qa and qb by j-deviations of pa and pb respectively for some agent j ∈ N −{i},
such that pa|N−{ j} = qa|N−{ j}, pb|N−{ j} = qb|N−{ j} and qa( j) = qb( j) = (pa( j)−
{(x,y)})∪{(y,x)} for some alternatives x,y ∈ A. Because VN is convex restricted
domain, thus in order to prove f (Xa) = {a} and f (Xb) = {b} it is sufficient to prove
that f (qa) = a and f (qb) = b. Assumption (α) yields that j = ixy. But as j 6= i
and i = iab, this implies by assumption (α) that {a,b} 6= {x,y}. If a /∈ {x,y}, then
by Maskin monotonicity we have f (qa) = a and f (qb) 6= a. But as Strong Positive
Association and f (qa) = a imply f (qb) ∈ {a,b}, it follows that f (qb) = b. Hence, if
a /∈ {x,y}, then f (qa) = a and f (qb) = b. Similarly it follows that if b /∈ {x,y}, then
f (qa) = a and f (qb) = b. Because {a,b} 6= {x,y}, at least one of these implications
hold and therewith f (qa) = a and f (qb) = b. Hence, f (Xa) = {a} and f (Xb) = {b}.
For R ∈ Vi let XR = {p ∈ VN | p(i) = R}. Hence, Xa = Xpa(i) and Xb = Xpb(i). The
following two claims complete the proof.
Claim 4.1. Let R ∈ Vi be such that f (XR) = {x}. Then x = best(R| f (VN)).
To the contrary let x 6= y= best(R| f (VN)). Then there are py ∈VN such that f (py) = y.
Consider i-deviation pxy of py such that pxy|N−{i} = py|N−{i} and pxy(i) = R. Because
f (XR) = {x} we have f (pxy) = x and herewith f is manipulable by agent i at pxy
towards profile py.
Claim 4.2. Let R1 and R2 be two relations in Vi that form an elementary change in
x,y ∈ A, i.e. R1 = (R2 −{(y,x)})∪{(x,y)}. Let f (XR1) = {c} for some alternative c
in A. Then f (XR2) = {d} for some alternative d in A.
In case x 6= c Maskin monotonicity and f (XR1) = {c} imply f (XR2) = {c}. So, sup-
pose c = x. We are also done if f (XR2) = {c}. As Vi is a convex restricted domain
we therefore may assume that there are pc ∈ XR1and pd ∈ XR2 where c = f (pc) 6=
f (pd) = d and pc|N−{i} = pd |N−{i}. Now similarly to the proof of f (Xa) = a and
f (Xb) = b it follows that f (XR2) = {d}.
Claims 4.1, 4.2 and the fact that VN is a convex restricted domain imply that f is
image-dictatotrial.
Summarising the above results yields
Corollary 4.1. For all agents i Vi = {R ∈ L(A)|Pi ⊆ R} for some partial ordering
Pi referred to as i’s a priori information. Let P∗ = ∪{Pi|i ∈ N} denote the collective
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a priori information. Let U = undom(P∗) be the set of undominated elements with
respect to this collective a priori information P∗. Then (1) and (2) are equivalent,
where
1. There exist non-image-dictatorial, unanimous and strategy-proof choice rules
f from VN to A;
2. One of the following three is true:
a There are two different alternatives a and b such that U = {a,b};
b There is one alternative a such that U = {a}; there is an alternative b ∈
A−{a} and there are two different agents, say i and j, such that (a,b) /∈
Pi ∪P j;
c Set U is empty; there are two different alternatives, say a and b, and two
different agents, say i and j, such that (a,b) /∈ Pi∪P j and (b,a) /∈ Pi∪P j.
4.5 An application
In this section we apply the main result of the previous section to a choice problem
where the set of alternatives consists of ordered pair of commodity bundles, which
are denoted by unique points on the Euclidean plane. This application can trivially
be extended to cases where the set of alternatives consists of n-tuples of commodity
bundles. Consider a set of agents N = {1, . . . ,N} and a finite set alternatives on
Euclidean plane denoted by A. As mentioned above, R denotes a relation on A, and
the set of linear orderings are denoted by L(A).
Let for any agent i, the set of admissible preference Vi satisfy monotonicity i.e.,
‘more-is-better’ for all the agents. Moreover let Vi be a subset of L(A). For any agent
i, more-is-better gives a priori information Pi for the agent’s preference. However
this a priori information does not give a relation between all the alternative. For
example, consider a = (a1,a2) and b = (b1,b2) such that a1 ≥ b1 and a2 < b2, then
(a,b),(b,a) /∈ Pi. Thus, Vi = L(Pi,A) = {R ∈ L(A) : Pi ⊆ R}, which implies that Vi
is a convex subset of L(A) and VN is a convex restricted domain.
Since Vi need not be the same for each agent i, we can also extend the above model to
the case when preferences of all the agents need not satisfy monotonicity. Thus there
might be some agents, who consider the alternatives as bad, while some who consider
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them as goods. Moreover there maybe some agents who consider the alternatives as
good, but their preferences might still not satisfy monotonicity, e.g. satiated prefer-
ence. This gives a priori information Pi for every agent i. However, Vi is a subset of
L(A) and Vi = L(Pi,A) = {R ∈ L(A) : Pi ⊆ R} implies that Vi is convex and VN is a
convex restricted domain.
Let P∗ = ∪{Pi|i ∈ N} and U = undom(P∗). By Corollary 4.1, there exist non-image-
dictatorial, unanimous and strategy-proof choice rule f from VN to A if and only if
either one of the following three holds:
a There are two different alternatives a and b such that U = {a,b};
b There is one alternative a such that U = {a}; there is an alternative b ∈ A−{a}
and there are two different agents, say i and j, such that (a,b) /∈ Pi ∪P j;
c Set U is empty; there are two different alternatives, say a and b, and two different
agents, say i and j, such that (a,b) /∈ Pi ∪P j and (b,a) /∈ Pi ∪P j.
4.6 Conclusions
Corollary 4.1 describes the convex restricted domains which allow for unanimous,
non-image-dictatorial and strategy-proof choice rules. The main requirement that
there are at most two undominated alternatives with respect to the united a pri-
ori information is considerably restrictive. Therefore the characterisation can also
be seen as an impossibility result. On the other hand these conditions would only
change marginally if anonymity were taken instead of non-image-dictatorship. Where
anonymity is a condition that imposes that the choice rule can be defined on the fre-
quency distributions of the preferences in a profile. So, agents are treated equally.
Indeed considering Example 4.1 it is easy to define anonymous choice rules on two
alternatives. The case of two undominated alternative would not change at all. In case
of one or no undominated alternative, however, differences with Corollary 4.1 occur,
because for instance a constant rule is anonymous but also image-dictatorial.
Another condition frequently imposed on choice rules is Pareto-optimality. It means
that an alternative x is not chosen when there are alternatives y which all agents
(strictly) prefer to x. It is not difficult to see that the choice rules of Example 4.1
are not necessarily Pareto-optimal. There are however special cases of this exam-
ple which allow for Pareto-optimal, non-image dictatorial and strategy-proof choice
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rules. To illustrate this take the same notations and assumptions as in Example 4.1.
Furthermore, assume that for all c ∈ A−{a,b} (a,c) ∈ P∗. Now the following impu-
tation rule f is well-defined and satisfies these three conditions.
f (p) = b if (b,a) ∈ p(i) for all agents i ∈ N
= a in all other cases.
Pareto-optimality is a stronger condition than unanimity. In view of the restrictive
result spelled out by Corollary 4.1 we therefore did not incorporate an extensive study
on convex restricted domains which allow for Pareto-optimal, non-(image)-dictatorial
and strategy-proof choice rules.
Based on Corollary 4.1 and the remarks made above one might argue that changing
the conditions of admissible choice rules will not lead to more general convex re-
stricted domains which allow for such rules. Hence the concept of convexity is too
restrictive after all. Indeed if we weaken the convexity condition, i.e. that all interme-
diate preferences of two admissible preferences are admissible, into connectedness,
i.e. there is a path of intermediate preferences leading from one to the other admis-
sible preference, then more general restricted domains may allow for "nice" choice
rules. For example the domains discussed here as well those of single peaked pref-
erences fall under this connectedness condition and both allow for acceptable choice
rules.
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Valorisation
Valorisation of knowledge refers to the application of scientific knowledge in practice.
It aims at creating societal significance from learning by making this information
accessible. Valorisation is not just about ‘money’, but also about how the exchange
of learning and ideas help the society.
Specifically, this Valorisation helps me to think about why I spent the last few years of
my life as a PhD researcher and whether my contributions are helpful to the society.
I not only tried to contribute to the society by doing research, but I also contributed
to the education of others by teaching in a number of courses. In this section, I try to
discuss the societal relevance of the topics discussed in this thesis.
The first part of this thesis broadly studies how ‘desirable’ matchings can occur in
society with couples. In real life, we often encounter scenarios where an institution
has to be matched with individuals, be it schools with students, hospitals with doctors,
firms with workers, etc. Often, there are individuals who want to be matched to the
same location. Thus, it is important to know when it is possible to avoid undesirable
matchings. This thesis looks at different conditions which might be necessary to
achieve the desired results.
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In the second chapter, we study under what conditions can members of the couple de-
viate from their individual preferences to be together. This is a very practical problem
which couples often face. For example, a person might prefer the school at Amster-
dam to the school at Maastricht, but might be willing to change her preference if her
better half prefers the school at Maastricht to that at Amsterdam just to be together
with her partner.
In the third chapter, we study whether combining individual preferences to get a pref-
erence for couples is enough to get a desirable matching. The result we obtain is
somewhat counter intuitive, but it is still applicable in society today, since it shows
that even if the individuals form a couple, there still needs to be altruism to avoid
undesirable matchings. This is because, in the above example, the combination of in-
dividual preferences has no preference implication between the two situations where
both the agents are matched to the same school. This creates a problem of ambiguity,
which can only be overcome if there is a sense of altruism among the members of the
couple.
The second part of the thesis deals with the aggregation of individual opinions and
preferences to reach a collective decision outcome. This is widely used in many
situations, for example in voting, or enacting a law in the constitution, deciding on
the location of a public good based on peoples’ preferences, etc. In the fourth chapter,
we study the situation in which a part of individuals’ preferences is known. This is
closely associated with what we encounter in daily life. A part of an individual’s
preference is revealed by religious beliefs, behavior on internet, political views, health
conditions, etc. In our study, for different individuals different preference parts may
be known. For instance, a vegetarian prefers cheese to any food item containing meat,
where a lactose intolerant person would never prefer cheese to any other dish. This
study tries to find the socially acceptable outcome in such a situation.
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